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Cloth, Clothing, and Cloth-Theft in Defoe's England

Melissa Johnson

Melissa is a senior history major who wrote this article for the lower division
course, Historical Research and Writing, which is required of all history
majors. Dr. Newton Key taught the course, which focused on the historical
context and sources of Daniel Defoe's Moll Flanders.

Daniel Defoe's famous novel Moll Flanders has been used by historians and
literary critics alike to study early eighteenth century London, gender roles,
the colonial trade, and the criminal world into which the heroine Moll
(1)

sank.

The novel can also be used to reveal the role of textiles in early
(2)

modern England.
Daniel Defoe uses cloth as a metaphor for many social
transactions throughout Moll Flanders. The heroine's name, Flanders, even
describes an illegally imported lace fabric while Moll herself steals cloth
because it could easily be converted to cash. This paper focuses on the
historical context of cloth, clothing, and the theft of cloth in the novel to
argue that clothing represents the possibility of advancement within society,
greed, and a readily available cash form.
Was the second-hand clothes trade respectable in eighteenth century
London? According to Beverly Lemire, although the trade mainly consisted of
clothes obtained by legitimate means, thieves provided a large portion of
(3)

the trade.

"Fashion ...inspired the theft of clothing on a massive scale by
(4)

both amateur and professional thieves."
Madeleine Ginsburg, however, argues that
"second-hand clothes dealing was regarded as a respectable and profitable way of earning a
living, carried out by the clothes brokers and salesmen."(5) Ginsburg claims that personal
servants brought the majority of second-hand clothes to the market.(6) Whether or not the theft
of clothing was large scale, it became perpetuated by fashion obsession, greed, and the ease in
transferring the stolen goods for cash.
Defoe asserts fashion obsession accompanied by social advancement contributed to crime which
remained a major social problem in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Moll
Flanders steals, primarily cloth, to advance her social standing. Moll obtains money for the cloth

and buys exceedingly expensive clothes to imitate a higher social rank.
English society was highly stratified. M. Dorothy George writes, "[i]t was an age of minute
social distinctions, lines were drawn between the artisan and the labourer, the master and
journeyman ...often [with] distinctive dress."(7) Moll realizes the importance of dressing the part
of a lady, having "clothes to set me off.... [T]hey entertained me ...but like they thought I had
been, namely a widow of great fortune" (103). Moll's Irish landowner woos her in order to gain
an imaginary fortune, which he suspects Moll possesses because of her fine dress.
The hierarchy extended into all aspects of life. "Society" consisted primarily of the gentry while
lower levels merely existed.(8) The highest ranks of society dictated ways of life to the lower
ranks.(9) A person's social status required identification by their clothing. As the London Spy
noted, "[s]hopkeepers can distinguish a Country Man as well by his Looks, as a Parson by his
Robes ...to promote the sale of their goods."(10) Moll dresses genteelly and desires being
mistaken for a gentlewoman. Such deceit directs Moll's entire life.
Fashion awareness was a socio-economic issue in early modern London. Samuel Pepys, a
wealthy diarist writing in the 1660s, was minutely aware of the social implications of his and his
wife's dress (a concern, perhaps, due to his lowly origins.(11)
Mr. Clerke's coming to dine with me next Monday, I went to my wife and agreed upon matters;
and at last for my honour am forced to make her [his wife] presently a new Moyre gown to be
seen by Mrs. Clerke, which troubles me to part with so much money.(12)
A person had to maintain appearances to belong to certain social groups. The correct clothing
became an important part of appearance. Pepys thought "clothes[,] I perceive more and more
every day, is a great matter."(13) Moll desires the status of a gentlewoman, even though the goal
is essentially unattainable because she was born to a convict in Newgate Prison.
Early modern Londoners thought of society as relatively stable allowing little movement through
the social ranks. But the lines became blurred when people chose to wear clothes not befitting
their position in life and deceit prevailed. Madeleine Ginsburg writes, "clothes implied status and
...wearing what was inappropriate ...might be socially misleading."(14) Moll purposely misleads
gentleman on at least four occasions, and each time she marries well, and higher than her own
station. Each gentleman speculates Moll possesses a fortune based upon her dress. Pepys noted a
similar social mistake based on dress, "taking Captain Herbert home to my lodging ...who did
seriously enquire after who was that in the black dress with my wife yesterday, and would not
believe that it was my wife's maid Mercer; but it was she."(15) Servants during this time were not
issued a standard uniform, but often wore the cast-off clothing of their mistress or master.(16)
Distinguishing between divisions of society became almost impossible. Henry Fielding, writing
in the mid-eighteenth century, asserted,
one known division of the people in this nation is into the nobility, the gentry, and the

commonalty, what alterations have happened among the two former of these, I shall not at
present inquire; but the last, in their customs, manners, and habits, are greatly changed from
what they were ...the lower sort [of people] ...is changed ...the simplicity of their manners into
craft; their frugality into luxury; their humility into pride, and their subjection into equality.(17)
Clothing became a vehicle to a better life by imitation. And clothing which was unaffordable,
was bought second-hand or stolen.(18) Defoe notes, "there are temptations which it is not in the
power of human nature to resist, and few know what would be their case if driven to the same
exigencies, as covetousness is the root of all evil, so poverty is the worst of all snares" (140).
Then as now, consumers desire to wear fashionable clothing. Greed causes people to desire fine
articles of clothing and better lives, sometimes extremely beyond their means. Moll stole a way
up the social ladder.
In January 1734, The Gentleman's Magazine called for the re-establishment of the sumptuary
laws, "of great importance for preserving the distinction and order so necessary to the different
ranks of men."(19) Sumptuary laws prohibited different classes from wearing the same attire.
Fielding noted that without such laws,
the nobleman will emulate the grandeur of a prince and the gentleman will aspire to the proper
state of the nobleman, the tradesman steps from behind his counter into the vacant place of the
gentleman; nor doth the confusion end here; it reaches the very dregs of the people, who aspiring
still to a degree beyond that which belongs to them.(20)
Defoe's Moll claims, "I had nearly 200 pounds for my share [a significant sum].... I had still a
cast for an easy life.... [P]overty brought me in, so avarice kept me in" (151). In the end, Moll
depends upon her own cunning and skill as a thief to obtain her dream of wealth.
Crime increased because population and poverty rose in England during the early eighteenth
century.(21) England continued transporting criminals to the New World. When Moll Flanders
finds herself in jeopardy and becomes a criminal, she primarily steals cloth. Her first theft
includes a laced child-bed linen, more linen, a smock, and three silk handkerchiefs. These types
of items were readily available and easily shifted away from the crime scene. As historian,
Lemire notes, "clothing was the most sought-after, and at the same time, most easily disposable
commodity in this period."(22) The Newgate Calendar, a summary of the most notable felons
hung at Tyburn Cross, records thefts of shoes, handkerchiefs, a coat, and 108 yards of woollen
cloth.(23) Even Pepys's wife was robbed of clothing.
Bringing home in a coach her new ferraddin waistecoate, in Cheapside a man asked her whether
that was the way to the Tower; and while she was answering him, another on the other side
snatched away her bundle out of her lap and could not be recovered, but ran away with it; which
vexes me cruelly, but it cannot be helped.(24)
Cloth became easily converted into cash and inflamed the lust for a fortune.

The second-hand clothes trade allowed ease for disposal of stolen goods. Shopkeepers,
pawnbrokers, chapmen, and tradesmen were instrumental in dispersing second-hand cloth and
clothing.(25) Corrupt cloth brokers and pawnbrokers were thieves themselves.(26) A notorious
criminal of the time was Jonathan Wild, "the Prince of Robbers."(27) Jonathan Wild planned
with fellow thieves to steal items and then return those items to the rightful owners for a
reward.(28) This activity netted the thief a larger sum than would be gained by re-selling the
item. In Moll Flanders, the governess provides a similar pawnbroker service for Moll, by
disposing of stolen items.
Robbery victims promoted thieving, by advertising rewards for returned items in
newspapers.(29) For example, an advertisement in the London Gazette during 1714 reads,
lost from the Vine Tavern in Thames-street ...a bundle with 2 large and 2 small down pillows,
several suits of laced headcloths and ruffles, 2 suits of fine Macklin Lace Pinnar broad, with
other linnen, and things of value; whoever shall bring or discover these things, so as they may be
had again, to Mr. Crowch, Poulterer at Smithfield Bars, shall have a reward ...for the whole, or
proportionable for any part, and no questions asked.(30)
The enticement of quick money and anonymity provided the thief with an incentive to steal.
Theft of clothing, a major problem in early modern London, depended upon pawnbrokers and
merchants willing to turn items into cash.(31) Fielding thought, "that if there were no receivers
there would be no thieves, indeed could not the thief find a market for his goods, there would be
an absolute end of several kinds of thefts; such as shoplifting, burglary, &c., the objects of which
are generally goods and not money."(32) A thief often traded an item for services or essential
goods.(33) A stolen item could easily become lost in the maze of London shops, taken to the
country by a chapman, or the piece totally re-done by a tailor.(34) People spent extra money on
clothes and the clothing market attempted tomeet its new-found popularity.(35) Thievery
provided the extra clothing needed by the market.
Defoe's view of social transactions, as asserted in Moll Flanders, corroborates Lemire's theory
that the second-hand clothes trade seemed destined to corruption. Clothes turned into cash
swiftly, via the pawnbrokers and second-hand clothes dealers. In early modern England, people
were concerned with the appearance of possessing status and class. As Defoe's Moll
demonstrates so well, clothing made the woman.
th
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The Sepoy Mutiny, 1857: The Indian View

Ron Peters

The following two articles, Ron Peters on the Indian perspective of the Sepoy Mutiny and Greg
Aydt on the Cuban perspective of the Spanish-American War, are written by two M.A. in History
graduate students at Eastern Illinois. Both first wrote the essays in Dr. Roger Beck's seminar in
European Imperialism. Both are presented here as historical responses to consideration of the
"Other" in history.

We're marchin' on relief over Injia's sunny plains,
A little front o' Christmas time an' just be'ind the Rains,
Ho! get away, you bullock-man, you've 'eard the bugle blowed,
There's a regiment a-comin' down the Grand Trunk Road.
Rudyard Kipling, "Route Marchin"

An' I'll get a swig in hell from Gunga Din!
Yes, Din! Din! Din!
You Lazarushian-leather Gunga Din!
Though I've belted you and flayed you,
By the living Gawd that made you,
You're a better man than I am, Gunga Din!
Rudyard Kipling, "Gunga Din"

European conflicts embroiled indigenous peoples and foreign trading
companies into eighteenth-century wars of imperial conquest. In 1746,
Marquis de Joseph Dupleix captured Madras during the War of Austrian
Succession and augmented French forces with native Indian soldiers

(Sepoys). The French Compagnie des Indes and the English East India
Company actively recruited native alliances for the next fifteen years in their
struggle to control the Coast and the adjacent Carnatic province. The French
capture of Madras showed the English the military necessity for an East
India Company Sepoy army. In 1756, Clive marched 1,200 Madras Sepoys
and 800 East India Company soldiers and secured Bengal for the company.
The Seven Years War produced two changes for the East India Company:
the French Compagnie des Indes surrendered its holdings in India and the
(1)

East India Company assumed political and military control of India.
Ninety-six years after the Treaty of Paris (1761), the East India Company's
Sepoy army turned against its masters.
The revolt of 1857 was not the first mutiny. British regular and European
East India Company troops revolted in 1766: the Sepoys remained steadfast
(2)

and entertained no equivocation of duty.
When the British violated the
Sepoys' enlistment promises, the Sepoys reacted and mutinied. At Vellor in
1806, at Barrackpur in 1824 and 1852, in the North-West Provinces in 1844,
and in the Punjab in 1849-50, the Sepoy solders mutinied in order to right
(3)

military grievances.
A long grievance list produced the tumultuous,
violent results of 1857.
Individuals had widely differing motivations for enlisting in the army.
European and Indian ranks and files evolved from distinct military cultures.
European troops entered military service as a last resort: to escape from
(4)

Indians,
poverty, domestic crisis, or to evade criminal or civil justice.
despite caste or religion, entered the East India Company's regiments for
(5)

mercenary reasons and status.
Peers who examined government records
concluded that Indian soldiers committed less crime, were rarely arrested on
drunk and disorderly charges, and displayed higher moral standards than
(6)

English Commonwealth soldiers.
were the reasons for mutiny as
multifarious as those for enlisting?
What reasons provoked the Sepoys to mutiny? The Illustrated London News,
of August 22, 1857, stated:
The public begin to perceive that not two or three, but a thousand, causes
have been at work, and that if we are to retain India a radical reform, not
only of our military and administrative systems, must be introduced, but our
social and political relations with the Indian tribes, peoples, races, and
nations, must undergo a change large and thorough enough to merit the
name of a Revolution.

The Illustrated London News voiced many of the mutiny's root causes within
the framework of the East India Company's military and administrative
departments, but naively missed the main cause-reform. East India
Company employees and officers, both military and administrative,
introduced many reforms. Social reforms produced animosities and distrust
among the native people. The English outlawed "Thuggee" and "Dakoiti"
cults as a method to control lawless and dangerous behavior. Familial
reforms targeted Sati, infanticide, and the husband's right to execute his
wife. Company directors abolished slavery. Missionaries implemented
education (in English language and writing), and established orphanages.
Both Hindus and Muslims viewed these "improvements" as methods to
convert the people to Christianity. But, the people viewed the British
anti-caste behavior and attitude as the greatest threat to the native religion
(7)

and culture.

Some social reforms directly destabilized local political hegemony. Local land
reform, European settlement, tax farming, and the East India Company's
policies of annexation outwardly appear as social reforms, but represented
political agendas. Early in the nineteenth century, the English began land
reforms in the North-West provinces. Feudal landlords watched in horror as
the Company gave land to the peasantry and collected taxes from them. The
landlords lost their lands and tax revenue. During the 1857 Mutiny, the
Bundelkhand thakurs (landlords) also rebelled against the English. These
landlords operated independently from the actions of the Sepoy mutineers
(8)

European settlement and tax farming
and the local rebelling potentates.
produced animosities from the local elite, local merchants, and the local
peasantry. The policy of annexation, especially the Oudh situation, created
bitter hatred toward the Company and formed major military problems.
The 1857 rebellion centered on the Company's annexation of Oudh. In 1818,
Sir John Malcolm had exiled the Mahratta Peshwa, Baji Rao, on an £80,000
annual pension to the kingdom of Oudh. Baji Rao sired two sons, both of
which died as infants. Hindu law required a son to officiate at the funeral
and release the father's soul. The custom with the Hindu allowed an adopted
son to fulfill this sacred duty. Raji Rao adopted Nana Sahib (Nana Govina
Dhondu Pant), a son of friend, an affinial relative and of the same caste as
the Peshwa. After the Peshwa's death, Nana Sahib petitioned the East India
Company for the annual pension of his adopted father. The East India
Company refused to grant the annuity and Nana Sahib sent emissaries to
England on his behalf. Nana Sahib's emissaries failed and complained that
all India's gold could not out-bribe the East India Company's power over the
Crown and Parliament.

(9)

Sixty-year old William Sleeman toured the Oudh countryside and drafted
evidence of misrule. Governor-General Dalhousie composed an ultimatum to
Wajid Ali Shah: turn over the Kingdom of Oudh or the British would use
military force. Wajid Ali Shah refused to sign the document in the name of
(10)

his son, Birjis Qadr. In response, the Company annexed Oudh.

The key link to these two ousted dynasties rested in the Nana Sahib's
Muslim secretary, Azimullah. Azimullah, highly educated in English and
diplomacy, petitioned the British Crown in Nana Sahib's behalf. Azimullah
utterly hated the British. Azimullah's intrigues linked not only two dynasties
but two religions, Hindu and Muslim. Azimullah printed pamphlets that called
for a Jihad against the infidel. Azimullah gathered disaffected Indian officers
(Hindu and Muslim) and presented seditious ideas. Azimullah expressed the
extent of his intrigues and seditious plans to the Turkish general Umar
Pasha in 1856, to garner Turkish support. It was Azimullah who formed an
infrastructure of Indian agents to distribute seditious anti-British propaganda
and not Russian agents, as the British believed. In July 1857 The Illustrated
London News wrote:
we have the strongest reasons to suspect, that Russian emissaries are, and
have long been, at work, not only at the outposts and frontiers of our Indian
Empire, but in the very heart of the country, in exciting disatisfaction
against British rule, and in stirring up the native population against us....
[T]hose who know Russia best, and India most, do not treat this supposition
with scorn; but, on the contrary, find too many reasons for believing that
every act of hostility against us ...is more or less connected with Russian
(11)

intrigues and Russian money.

British arrogance refused to accept the idea that the Company produced the
anti-British sentiments and that the Indians themselves could mastermind a
rebellion.
Sepoy disaffection reflected a long list of varied grievances and a long
history of errors. In 1796 the British forced "all sorts of novelties" upon the
Sepoy army.
[The Sepoy] was to be drilled after a new English fashion..., dressed after a
new English fashion..., shaved after a new English fashion.... They were
(12)

stripping him, indeed, of his distinctive Oriental character.

Before the 1796 Sepoy reorganization, British officers commanding Sepoy
troops knew the language and respected the culture of the Sepoy troops.
Officers and enlisted Sepoys dressed in oriental style. The Company utilized

the "irregular system" principle: Sepoy officers commanded the companies
and British officers commanded the regiments and brigades. Reorganization
regulated the Sepoy officers into inferior positions and introduced British line
officers into the Sepoy companies. Promotions of Sepoy officers followed the
English establishment-seniority over merit-consequently, few able young
Sepoy officers received promotions. English officers also failed to inspire the
(13)

native troops, nor found the needed respect of the Sepoys.
Even the
British press and public recognized the failings of the Company's officers.
The East India Company recruited young individuals to fill vacancies within
the regimental officer corps. These English officers had no prior military
experience nor did these officers know the language, customs, or even the
(14)

faces of the men under their command.
The majority of the officers were
ignorant of the military drills, looked down upon the enlisted natives, and
(15)

refused to associate with the native soldiers.
Consequently, British
sergeants and native Indian officers commanded the regiments. "The
average regimental officer was 'a youngster who makes curry, drinks
champagne and avoids the sun.' Leaving their Indian troops to the care of
Indian officers and British sergeants, European officers became increasingly
remote and disdainful ...carried the moods of schoolboys into the work of
(16)

men."
Failing to gain respect from the individual native soldier,
regimental officers faltered in preventing mutiny and rebellion.
In 1838 the British Indian army invaded Afghanistan. This invasion resulted
from British fears of Russian and Persian plots with Dost Mohamed, the
Afghanistan Amir. Governor-General Lord Auckland decided to replace the
Amir of Afghanistan. Kabul fell and the mission seemed accomplished, but
the Afghanistan people did not want their Amir replaced. The British Indian
army at Kabul, now found themselves besieged by the Afghanistan people
and retreated back to India. India no longer viewed the British military as an
invincible power. Britain lost the respect of the Indian people and especially
(17)

the Sepoys.

As respect and military discipline for the British dimmed after the
Afghanistan affair, reform movements targeted the military. The British
maintained military discipline by stern corporal punishments for even minor
infractions of military protocol. Reformers viewed military justice as
unusually cruel and thought the use of the lash as unnecessary in the
Bengal army. The East India Company recruited high caste Bengal
individuals for the Sepoy army and discouraged low caste members of
society.

The eighteenth-century Bengal army took into its ranks what were available,
and these tended to be the traditional military peasantries of North India
which comprised dominant land-owning and land-controlling groups who
combined with seasonal military employment. Membership in these societies
was consolidated through the adoption (or invention in some cases) of ritual
and practices intended to mark them out as exclusive and elevated above
the rest of rural society. Such customs, in British eyes, subsequently came
to define these recruits as being from the higher castes. British officers were
convinced that the sense of honour they identified as pervading these
groups made for a superior recruit, one who would be impelled to obey and
perform well by his own sense of self-respect, and not by the draconian
(18)

discipline believed necessary in regiments of European soldiers.

Bengal military courts had never emphasized the "lash" for infractions of
military duty. In 1835 Governor-General Lord William Bentinck outlawed
corporal punishment in all the Sepoy armies. In 1845 Governor-General Lord
(19)

Hardinge rescinded Bentinck's order and reestablished flogging.
Reinstatement of flogging insulted the Sepoy soldiers and especially the
Bengals.
When a Sepoy enlisted, the East India Company granted him certain
privileges. One of these privileges existed in the enlistment's geographical
extent. Six Sepoy regiments enlisted with the provision calling for foreign
service, and the other regiments would serve in India only. The Barrackpur
mutinies (1824 and 1852) resulted when Bengal regiments received orders
to fight in Burma. According to one historian, if the British had used enlisted
foreign service regiments, or the high command had called forth volunteers
(20)

for the Burma expedition, the Sepoys would not have revolted.

The kingdom of Oudh constituted the centerpiece for the 1857 Mutiny. On
February 7, 1856 the East India Company annexed Oudh and over ninety
percent of the Bengal army (and a large portion of the Bombay army), the
Company recruited had come from Oudh villages. Sepoys employed by the
Company enjoyed a unique privilege. Prior to annexation, Oudh Sepoys
possessed the right of petition to the British Resident at the Court of
Lucknow (Lakhnoa). Malleson writes that, "this right of petition was a
privilege the value of which can be realised by those who have any
knowledge of the working of courts of justice in a native state. The Resident
of Lakhnao was, in the eyes of the native judge, the advocate of the
(21)

This produced prestige and benefits for the Sepoy.
petitioning Sepoys."
Villagers regarded this privilege highly and, consequently, almost every
family had a representative to the court in the form of a Sepoy. Oudh's

annexation deprived this immemorial privilege and destroyed the Sepoy's
position of importance and influence in his own country. When the Mutiny
broke-out in May 1857, Oudh's Sepoys displayed great hatred toward the
British.

(22)

Religion played a significant part in the Mutiny. The Indian people, whether
Hindu or Muslim, viewed Christianity with suspicion and loathing. Indian
people viewed missionary schools and orphanages as institutions that only
benefitted the British by making Christian converts. British officers and/or
their wives distributed bibles and religious tracts to Sepoys. The native
people viewed reform of Sati and infanticide as methods to destroy
indigenous beliefs. Hindus felt extreme bitterness and hatred about British
attempts at caste dismantlement. Religion isolated the British from the
native people, who viewed the English as hypocritical practitioners of
Christianity. The Indian people and Sepoys especially targeted missionaries
(23)

Indian religious
and proselytizing military officers during the Mutiny.
retribution required an atonement with the lives of British men, women, and
children.
Using religion, conspirators spread anti-British propaganda. This propaganda
addressed both Hindu and Muslim. Azimullah printed seditious material
against the British, but an Oudh thakur (the Maulaví of Faizábád, named
Ahmad-ullah, or Ahmad Shah) promoted and fomented the most extensive
network of propaganda. The Maulaví recruited many other learned men and
priests to pass information across the countryside. Ahmad-ullah
manufactured and disseminated rumors, both personally and through this
network. One rumor claimed that the British intended to marry Crimean War
army widows to Sepoy troops. The marriage of a Sepoy to a white women
would have destroyed the Sepoy's caste and force the Sepoy to accept
Christianity. Another rumor circulated about money, currency made from
leather and not paper or specie. Accepting this currency would have
destroyed the Hindus' caste. The British inadvertently issued the best
propaganda tool of Ahmad-ullah: the 1853 Pattern Enfield rifle and the new
.577 Metford-Pritchitt cartridge. The cartridge produced the spark to inflame
(24)

the Sepoys into mutiny.

Kaye explains that

there was one thing wanting to the conspirators-the means, the
instrument-with which to kindle to action the great body of their
countrymen.... [W]hen they heard of the new cartridge-a cartridge smeared
with animal fat and which they were told was bitten, [they had] the weapon
they wanted.... To tell a body of Hindus, already suspicious of their foreign
master, that they would be required to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat

of their sacred animal, and to tell Muhammadans that they would be
required to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of an animal whose flesh
was forbidden to them, was tantamount to tell them that their foreign
master intended to make them break with their religion.... In this lesser
sense, then, and in this only, did the cartridges produce mutiny. They were
the instruments used by conspirators; and those conspirators were
successful in their use of the instruments only because ...the minds of the
Sipáhis and of certain sections of the population had been prepared to
believe every act testifying to bad faith on the part of their foreign
(25)

masters.

The anti-British rumor/propaganda implementation epitomized the skill and
daring of the rebellion's leaders.
The 1857 India Mutiny resulted from changing British attitudes. Initially,
Britain maintained a conservative attitude towards India. Edmund Burke and
Adam Smith argued for control over the East India Company's affairs in
India. Pitt's India Act (1784) established reorganization and regulation of the
East India Company's Indian administration, and placed the company under
Parliament's responsibility. The thrust of Pitt's India Act rested in principles
(26)

to preserve and promote India's practices, institutions and traditions.
George Bearce writes, "Burke understood that the right ordering of society
depended on 'a limited state and a prescribed use of powers' and that the
(27)

political order existed to free not to oppress men."
British attitudes
toward India eroded from Burke's enlightened approach. When Parliament
chose Lord Cornwallis as Governor-General of India (1786-93, 1805-28),
Cornwallis implemented imperial policies instead of limited or conservative
policies and introduced British principles and institutions. Whig
governmental theory dominated Cornwallis's administrative aims to prevent
corruption in India. Cornwallis lacked faith and trust in the Indian
governmental institutions and Anglicized the Indian political administration.
Administration changes produced the first reforms and led the way for
(28)

further reforms.

Imperial sentiments emerged during the era of the French Revolution, the
Napoleonic wars, and the Industrial Revolution. Evangelical Christian
missionary zeal introduced controversial elements for both advocates and
opponents of imperialism. Initially, Indian missionary work evoked
opposition from both the imperialists and the anti-imperialists as detrimental
(29)

By the 1830s, imperial sentiments altered. New
to the welfare of India.
intellectual attitudes replaced conservative Burkean ones. Adam Smith

expounded on the economic theory of laissez-faire, Jeremy Bentham's
theories spawned the Utilitarian movement, and John Wesley inspired
various British religious sects with missionary zeal. Consequently, from the
1830s to the 1857 Mutiny, humanitarian reformers and Christian
(30)

missionaries flooded India and incensed the Indian people.

The Mutiny and the aftermath produced British public opinion changes.
Initial reports of the massacre of English women, children and soldiers
galvanized the British public. Britain wanted revenge for the deaths of
British white subjects. On July 18, 1857, The Illustrated London News wrote,
"after the suppression of the revolt, and the punishment of the ringleaders
...there must be no smouldering discontent left unnoticed and
unsuspected.... [W]hat the Sword of Might has gained, the Sword of Right
must preserve." But, the British public also questioned revenge as a method
of policy from the rebellion's outbreak.
We owe the people of India much. We owe them peace, we owe them
security, we owe them good government; and if we pay them these debts
many blessings will follow. By these means we may be enabled to make
amends for the arbitrariness of our rule by its justice and its beneficence.
Let us not make the mistake of thinking that we owe them Christianity, and
of endeavouring to force it upon them before they are ripe to receive it.
Christianity was never yet successfully inculcated by the sword, and never
will be. Soldiers and railroads are what are needed in India; and, if the
savage outbreak of Meerut and Delhi prove of providing both, that Mutiny,
distressing as it is, will have, in all probability, the great merit of being the
last, and of preparing the way for the permanent pacification and real
prosperity of India.

(31)

Contemporary newspapers challenged the East India Company's
administrative methods: "what shall be said of the fitness of the East India
Company to rule, or of the efficacy of the Board of Control to keep the
Company right when, from motives of economy, sheer apathy, carelessness,
(32)

or ignorance, it manifests an inclination to go wrong?"
After the brutal
suppression of the Mutiny, British opinion against the East India Company's
administration policies produced direct Crown rule and administration. The
Mutiny shattered Company rule over India and, ironically, the suppressed
Mutiny achieved one of its goals. After the Mutiny, while
[s]tanding guard over Green [probably, Jamie Green, native cook of a
Mutinied regiment, condemned for treason and spying] and Sarvur Khan as
they awaited execution, Forbes-Mitchell prevented his fellow Highlanders
from procuring "pork from the bazaar to break their castes" and provided

the condemned men with a last meal and a hookah. Out of gratitude, Green
confessed to Forbes-Mitchell that he was no native Christian but Mohamed
Ali Khan, the Rohilkhand nobleman who had accompanied Azimullah to
London and Constantinople, where together they had "formed the resolution
of attempting to over throw the Company's Government. "Thank God,"
Mohamed Ali said, "we have succeeded in doing that, for from the
newspapers which you lent me, I see that the Company's rule has gone, and
that their charter for robbery and confiscation will not be renewed." He and
(33)

Sarvur Khan were hanged the next morning.

From the eighteenth century, the East India Company set in motion the
causes for the 1857 Mutiny. Religion played a central role in shaping Indian
animosity. Reform measures, well intentioned, alienated both Sepoys and
the populace. British defeat in the Afghanistan campaign, destroyed Sepoy
confidence in British invincibility. Company annexation of Oudh produced
loathing and hatred for English policies. Into this volatile brew, add two
individuals-Azimullah and the Maulavi of Oudh-both masters of propaganda
and the end result equals rebellion. The East India Company generated the
seeds of the 1857 rebellion-as the Company exchanged its role as
trader/merchant to imperial/trader/nation administrator, the Mutiny grew.
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The traditional view of the Spanish-American War begins with the infamous explosion of the
U.S. battleship Maine, and proceeds through convincing American army and navy victories. This
narrative however, lacks one crucial item: the views of the Cuban people themselves. Even the
very name assigned to the war itself seems to ignore this major participant, who was involved
from the very beginning. The fight against Spain which the United States joined in 1898 already
had been carried on by the Cuban people for several years. Traditionally, historians have viewed
the entrance of the United States into the Cuban Revolution as a prerequisite for the defeat of
Spain on the island. From the Cuban perspective, this interpretation is open to debate, as is the
American motivation for entering the conflict.
Cuba's Second War for Independence began late in February of 1895. A previous attempt to
overthrow the Spanish rulers of Cuba had been defeated in 1878, but the intervening years had
not seen much improvement in the status of the Cuban people. While the use of the terms Cuban
and Spanish may imply that the two sides were of different ethnic backgrounds, this is not
necessarily the case. The Indian population of the island had essentially been eliminated when
colonization first occurred, and no foreign immigration was allowed. Consequently, about four
out of every five Cubans were actually Spaniards, or of second, third or fourth generation
Spanish descent. The remainder, about one out of every five Cubans, were Creole mulattos and
descendants of former slaves from Africa. This meant that, for the most part, the Cuban
Revolution was actually a civil war between republicans from Cuba and monarchists from
Spain.(1)
A Cuban patriot named José Martí organized the revolution from his base of operations in the
United States. For years, Martí had been working among the Cuban emigrés, both in the United
States and in nations throughout Latin America, attempting to plan a revolt against the Spanish
government in Cuba. The revolutionary heartland was Florida, where there were sixty-one clubs
devoted to Cuban independence. These clubs, known as juntas, asked their members to donate
one tenth of their earnings to the independence movement. Many members also joined the newly
formed Cuban Revolutionary Party during 1892. This party served as the political movement
behind the revolution. While the juntas were most numerous in Florida, there was also an
important independence group in New York. They contributed, not monetarily, but by obtaining

the support of two key groups: the labor unions and the newspapers.(2)
By 1894, Martí decided to launch the revolution. One of the primary reasons for his decision to
launch the attack at this time was his fear that a growing imperialist movement in the United
States might prompt annexation before independence. Martí had good reason to believe this, as
U.S. Secretary of State James G. Blaine was a proponent of expansion. In fact, as early as 1881
Blaine had written, "[i]f ever ceasing to be Spanish, Cuba must necessarily become American
and not fall under any other European domination." Martí also observed the attempt by the
United States to annex Hawaii in 1893. Though the attempt did not succeed, it caused him to
believe that Cuba might be the next target of American expansion. As Blaine wrote in 1881,
"Hawaii ...holds in the western sea much the same position as Cuba in the Atlantic. It is the key
to the maritime dominion of the Pacific States as Cuba is the key to the Gulf trade."(3)
The similarities between Cuba and Hawaii were more than geographic. Hawaii's economy
subsisted on a single crop; ninety-nine percent of the island's exports in 1890 consisted of sugar
bound for the United States. When the United States began giving American growers a bounty of
two cents per pound, Hawaiian sugar cane growers were devastated. Obviously, owners of sugar
cane plantations would find annexation to be beneficial for their pocketbooks. Cuba's situation
was almost identical. For this reason, Martí knew that if the United States attempted to bring
Cuba into the Union, some wealthy Cubans would support the move. In spite of their small
numbers, these people presented a formidable threat to Martí because of their economic
power.(4)
A more immediate threat than the economic pressure caused even greater concern. Some Cubans
advocated asking the United States to help a potential revolution by sending American troops to
support the rebels in the field. From Martí's point of view, however, this was the last thing a
Cuban revolution needed. He bitterly opposed seeking any military intervention by United States
troops. Martí told why he opposed this in a letter to his friend and fellow patriot Gonzalo de
Quesada. He wrote, "I don't want the principle established of putting our fortunes into a body
where, because of its influence as a major country, the United States is to exercise the principal
part." He expressed his fears less diplomatically, but perhaps more succinctly, when he wrote
"[o]nce the United States is in Cuba, who will get her out?"(5)
In 1894, the United States levied a 40 percent tariff on imported sugar.(6) This led to an
economic depression in Cuba, causing Cuban sugar producers to begin looking for a way to
retain the United States as a possible outlet for excess sugar production. Martí knew that talk of
annexation would soon be occurring, both in Havana and Washington. He had already decided
that if Cuba was going to experience "the reality of independence," then she must win that
independence of her own accord and retain her sovereignty throughout the revolution.(7) With
the threat of annexation in mind, Martí stated just before the revolution began, "Cuba must be
free from Spain and the United States." After the revolt had begun, he described his reason for
launching the attack so quickly. "The Cuban war has broken out in America in time to prevent
...the annexation of Cuba to the United States." José Martí's words drive home the point that he

was concerned about both Spanish and American imperialism.(8)
Martí recruited other military leaders to command the revolutionary forces in battle. He chose
Máximo Gómez to act as the Commander-in-Chief of his army, and he also obtained the services
of Antonio Maceo to lead a portion of the Cuban revolutionaries. Both of these men had been
heroes of the earlier war against the Spanish in Cuba, so they would provide the insurrection
with instant legitimacy for most of the Cuban people. Gómez personified the spirit of the
revolution in the eyes of Cubans, and his dream was to become the George Washington of a
newly liberated Cuban nation. General Maceo also served as an inspiration to many Cubans. As
a mulatto, his participation in the rebellion convinced the mulattos and former slaves living in
Cuba that they too would benefit from the revolution's success.(9)
While these men led the military battle in Cuba, another important battle raged in the United
States. This fight was based in New York, where the local junta was filled with several powerful
Cuban emigrés. The leader of this organization of unnaturalized Cubans and their supporters was
Tomás Estrada Palma, a former schoolteacher now trying to free Cuba using his connections in
New York. The goal of the junta was to spread news from the revolution among New York's
influential newspaper reporters. Another key player in the United States was Martí's close friend
and associate Gonzalo de Quesada. De Quesada, although he referred to himself as the Cuban
Revolutionary Chargé d'Affairés, did not actually hold an official diplomatic post. Nonetheless,
this did not prevent him from lobbying for the Cuban cause in Washington. Unlike Martí, the
New York junta and de Quesada wanted United States intervention to quickly win the revolution
for Cuba.(10)
On May 19, 1895, the Spanish killed José Martí in battle. Not only had the Cuban Revolution
lost the man who had painstakingly planned and organized the insurrection, but they had also
lost the strongest voice against American intervention. To the very end, Martí warned his fellow
revolutionaries to guard against possible United States' intervention. The day before he was
killed, Martí began a letter to one of his many friends. The letter, though never finished, again
expressed Martí's apprehensions about the course of the revolution. "It is my duty," he wrote, "to
prevent, by the independence of Cuba, the United States from spreading over the West Indies
and falling, with that added weight, upon other lands of our America." Certainly, Martí was
aware of a danger that others either did not see, or chose to ignore; however, even Martí was not
optimistic about his chances of accomplishing his goal. He concluded his statement by noting "I
have lived inside the monster and know its insides-and my weapon is only the slingshot of
David."(11)
Traditionally, U.S. historians have viewed American intervention in Cuba in 1898 as saving the
Cuban revolution from impending defeat. A close examination casts considerable doubt on this
perspective. In February 1898, the Spanish general Ramón Blanco ordered a large army into
battle against General Gómez, intending to destroy Gómez's troops. The attack failed dismally.
By March 1, Gómez reported that "[t]he enemy is crushed and in complete retreat from here, and
the time which favored their operation passes without their doing anything." These are definitely
not the words of a Commander-in-Chief whose army is on the verge of collapse. In fact, by 1898

it was Spain, not the Cuban revolutionaries, who was on the ropes. While the Spanish generally
controlled the populated areas of the island, their armies could not defeat the Cuban rebels in
battle.(12)
Not only did the Cubans think they were winning the revolution, so did the American
government. Also on March 1, 1898, the U.S. State Department described the status of the
military situation on the island for the American Minister to Spain. The State Department noted
that "the Spanish armies have not achieved any success over the Cubans in more than two
months." The note also pointed out that General Blanco had "failed absolutely" in his attack on
Gómez. Furthermore, it stated that "the Cubans continue to dominate the Eastern half of the
island, and its columns are operating in the Western provinces without the Spaniards being able
to stop them." Finally, it expressed the Department's view of Spain's desperate attempt to pacify
the Cubans by offering them autonomy. This it called "an utter and complete failure." The report
summed up the status of Cuba by commenting that "the social and economic situation of the
country is worse than ever, and the national rehabilitation work appears more than the forces of
the autonomous regime can cope with." If the United States government really thought the
revolution was in danger of failure, they hid it well.(13)
The revolution's military leaders did not feel that their armies needed direct assistance from the
United States either. Martí may have been dead, but his policy was continued by Generals
Maceo and Gómez. Maceo wanted the United States to recognize the belligerency of the Cuban
Republic in a Congressional declaration. By doing this, the U.S. could then provide military
equipment to the poorly supplied Cuban rebels. Maceo also knew the declaration would give the
revolution a greater sense of moral legitimacy. His opinion on direct military intervention was
clear, however. The New York World quoted Maceo saying "I should not want our neighbors to
have to shed their blood for our cause. We can do that for ourselves." In a letter to the New York
junta's leader, Maceo left no doubt what he wanted, as well as what he did not want, from the
United States: "Do you really want to cut the war down? Bring Cuba 25,000 to 35,000 rifles and
a million bullets.… We Cubans do not need any other help."(14)
Further, in yet another letter, Maceo proudly announced, "Cuba is winning its independence by
the arms and hearts of its sons. She will be free in a short time without needing any other help."
He also feared the end result of U.S. assistance. "Neither do I expect anything from the
Americans. We must all depend on our own efforts. It is better to rise or fall without help than to
contract debts of gratitude to a neighbor so powerful." In his final note on the topic, Maceo held
his ground while acknowledging that many Cubans did not share his opinion: "Nor is American
intervention so advantageous to the future of Cuba as most of our compatriots think."(15)
General Gómez was even harsher in his critique of those Cubans who wanted the United States
to step in militarily. Those Cubans who disregarded "the North American Republic's absorbing
aspirations," in Gómez's opinion, were "morally" on the side of the Spanish. In his mind, to be
for U.S. intervention meant to be against the success of the revolution. According to Gómez,
"Cuba must not be beholden for its independence in any way, to foreign good graces."(16)

American newspaper writer Ambrose Bierce summarised Gómez's opinion in an apocryphal
conversation he published on October 3, 1898. Responding to an American general, Bierce
imagines Gómez saying, "[i]n other words, Cuba is to have no army of her own, but is to rely
altogether upon you. You offer us the independence of a dependency."(17)
The question of whether or not American intervention was necessary for Cuban independence
has been debated, even within Cuba, since the Spanish-American War. Initially, most Cuban
historians agreed with the consensus of American historians in the belief that American military
intervention was indeed critical to the defeat of Spain and the success of the revolution.
Gradually, however, Cuban historians began to change their views. By the time the Ninth
Historical Congress of Cuba met in 1950, they could unequivocally declare that "Cuba does not
owe its independence to the United States of North America, but to the efforts of its own
people." The statement proceeds to say that Cuba "brought about even before the intervention of
the United States in the Cuban-Spanish conflict the complete exhaustion of Spain's 'last man and
last peseta'." Although individual historians retained the traditional view, most determined that
American assistance had been unnecessary and unwarranted.(18)
In 1966, several Cuban historians expressed their opinions on the Cuban revolution and
American intervention. They admitted their findings were only preliminary and more research
needed to be done in Spanish and Cuban archives, but they generally agreed that while the U.S.
invasion of Cuba caused the war to end more quickly than it would have otherwise, the end
result was not really in doubt by early in 1898. The Spanish were going to be defeated; only the
length of the war remained to be determined. As historian Sergio Aguirre of the University of
Havana wrote, "[t]here is no doubt that the United States hastened the final decision, introducing
into the struggle the 'knockout' punch. But victory for the Cubans would have come in the end."
Aguirre based his opinions on the fact that the Spanish had no comparable response to the
invasion of Western Cuba by the revolutionary armies. As he said, "[w]hy presume that this
counter-strike would have been able to appear in 1898 or after?"(19)
A more recent historian of Cuban history went one step further. Louis Pérez argued that the
United States intervened in Cuba not because they wanted to help the Cubans defeat the Spanish,
but because they saw their opportunity to obtain Cuba slipping away in a successful revolution.
The U.S. government was well aware that Spain was about to lose Cuba. In 1898 William R.
Day, the American Assistant Secretary of State, wrote a confidential memorandum stating that
"it is now evident that Spain's struggle in Cuba has become absolutely hopeless." In Pérez's
opinion, the U.S. intervened because "[t]he success of Cuban arms ...challenged, too, pretensions
of colonial replacement." In other words, the United States could not allow Cuba to become an
independent nation, because this would take away the possibility of relatively easy annexation.
The United States had tried to annex Hawaii and failed. They wanted a better pretense to annex
Cuba. Saving Cubans from the Spanish was an opportunity to assert control in Cuba, but this
opportunity was about to disappear in a Spanish defeat.(20)
The force of this argument is supported by President William McKinley's war message to
Congress in April 1898. While McKinley requested the authority to intervene militarily in Cuba,

he did not state that the U.S. was acting in defense of Cuban independence. In fact, the concept
of independence for Cuba was not mentioned at all. The U.S. was entering Cuba to implement a
"forcible intervention …as a neutral to stop the war." This would entail "hostile constraint upon
both the parties to the contest." Far from aiding the Cubans, the Americans were simply going to
prevent either side from winning. Furthermore, the United States intended "to secure in the
island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its
international obligations." The President's message, however, made no mention of whether this
government would be an independent Cuban government, or whether it would be under U.S.
control. Congress would eventually force McKinley to accept the Teller Amendment, renouncing
permanent control of the island, but Cuban independence was still not recognized as part of the
compromise.(21)
While the typical American historian interprets the sinking of the U.S. battleship Maine as an
accidental factor which caused a great public outcry in the U.S., and ultimately the war with
Spain, Pérez has a different interpretation. He believes that the United States government seized
on the opportunity which the sinking of the Maine provided them. The Maine accident was used
"as a contrived pretext for war rather than a chance precipitant." The public outcry "was not so
much a spontaneous response to the destruction of the Maine as it was the result of deliberate
and cynical manipulation by pro-war elements, principally the yellow press and expansionist
politicians, who seized the occasion to advance larger policy goals." Rather than being swept
along against their will with the rising tide of public opinion in favor of war, the President and
Congress are seen as taking advantage of the accident to obtain what they already desired: war
with Spain for control of Cuba.(22)
There are Cuban historians who believe the American intervention was both necessary and
beneficial for Cuba. In 1972, Guillermo de Zéndegui wrote an article in which he praised the
United States for entering the Spanish-American War. He admitted that the Cuban patriots and
the United States politicians occasionally did not see eye-to-eye on various matters, but he stated
that "[t]he foreseeable risks in help from a nascent expansionist power, which at times appeared
as serious as they were certain, were worth facing." This was because the U.S. was "the only
nation in the Hemisphere at that time capable of standing up to Spain with force and, if it came
to it, imposing a solution satisfactory to the Cuban cause." He was also quite supportive of the
Congressional Joint Resolution of April 13, 1898, which amounted to a declaration of war
against Spain. He referred to it as "without doubt one of the grandest, most noble, and
spontaneous acts in the history of inter-American relations." Similarly, he calls this entire period
of American intervention in Cuba "an exemplary chapter" in U.S. history.(23)
He argued that Cuban patriots responded enthusiastically to the announcement that the U.S. was
going to intervene in Cuba. As an example, he provided the story of the Spanish General
Blanco's attempt to convince General Gómez to enter negotiations before the Americans actually
entered Cuba. Blanco warned Gómez that the Yankees were ambitious foreigners anxious to
annex the Cuban island. Gómez turned down the offer, informing the Spanish general that, "until
now I have had only feelings of admiration for the United States. I have written to President
McKinley and to General Miles thanking them for the American intervention in Cuba. I do not

see the danger of our being exterminated by the United States, to which you refer in your letter.
If that should happen, history will judge them." De Zendegui considered this to be "irrefutable
proof of the true feelings of the patriots at that time." Whether Gómez was speaking honestly, or
just diplomatically, is difficult to judge. Based on Gómez's previous statements, it appears that he
was simply unwilling to admit his true feelings about U.S. intervention in a diplomatic note to
his bitter enemy. Nonetheless, De Zéndegui is an example of a Cuban historian who favored
U.S. intervention.(24)
The debate over the purposes and goals of U.S. intervention in Cuba provides an interesting
example of the way in which different perspectives can lead to completely different
interpretations of the same event. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. By learning
the Cuban viewpoint of the Spanish-American War, however, I believe the overall picture of
what really happened is made clearer. Cubans and Americans should both benefit from the
continuing exchange of ideas and dialogue between historians from these two viewpoints.
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Why was Charleston, a small county seat fighting even to keep its
courthouse from moving to another town, chosen as the site for a new State
Normal School in 1895? Why was the school located south of the town,
when the most convenient means of transport, the railroad, was located to
the north? The answers, surprisingly, lie in health scares in Chicago as well
as the Columbian World Exposition of 1893.
By the mid-nineteenth century, there was an "instinct for improvement"
among community leaders and citizens. People were tired of the ugly,
chaotic conditions that existed in cities. It was a commonly held belief that
the urban environment was an unnatural and unhealthy place for humans.
These ideas transformed into a movement to elevate the urban population
by creating more beautiful and natural surroundings. Nature had the power
to instill the ideals of America's democratic rural past in the common man.
The rural cemetery movement of the 1830s had been translated into a
movement for public parks. Public parks were considered necessary to
protect public health, provide for recreation, and foster moral improvement
and republican virtue, which was disappearing as people lost their
connection to the land. City leaders were quick to adopt the vocabulary of
sanitary reform in promoting the creation of public parks and squares within
the cities.

(1)

By the end of the Civil War, the public generally understood that disease

was preventable. However, it was hard to motivate the public except when
epidemics created crises. Then people were willing to implement measures
aimed at controlling diseases. Medical theory at this time blamed filth in the
form of noxious odors or miasmas caused by decomposing garbage and
waste for epidemics. Therefore, reformers believed that cleanliness could
solve many of the nation's health problems. Epidemics usually initiated
massive cleanup campaigns. The New York Metropolitan Board of Health's
success in combating the 1866 cholera epidemic prompted other cities to
establish municipal boards of health. It also prompted a realization by
people that their own health and comfort depended in part on their
neighbor's and illustrated the need for more water to secure cleanliness.
But, the increased usage of water created drainage and disposal problems
(2)

since most cities did not have a network of drains and sewers.

Chicago in the 1850s had a reputation for being unhealthy. It was no
wonder because the city had no sewer system. Garbage and refuse was
thrown into the Chicago River or alleys. Drinking water came from shallow
wells or the lakeshore. Since the city had been built on the lake plain, it
always had a drainage problem. Chicago's problems and the attempts to fix
them mirrored what was occurring nationally.
The 1854 cholera epidemic was especially deadly. As a result, in 1855, the
city council established a Sewerage Commission, which brought in Ellis
Sylvester Chesbrough, the designer of Boston's water system, to design the
first comprehensive sewage system in the country. The system had to be
built in the middle of the street because the water table was so close to the
surface. The sewers were allowed to drain by gravity into the river. The new
system created a drier and somewhat healthier Chicago, but the river and
the city's drinking water became more polluted. So in 1864, Chesbrough
headed the construction of an intake tunnel in the lake out of the way of
mounting river pollution. However, the tunnel never worked right. Freshets
(3)

and spring floods periodically drove sewage into the water system.

Dr. John H. Rauch and other city health officials proposed the creation of
anti-dumping laws with strict enforcement. However, city leaders were
afraid that this would drive business out of the city. Instead, they chose to
adopt Chesbrough's plan to reverse the river and send the sewage through a
canal to the Illinois and Mississippi rivers where the water would dilute and
deodorize it. The project was completed in July of 1871 and Chicago's waste
became the problem of the smaller communities surrounding her. But,
shortly after the project was completed, John Wentworth and William Ogden
dug a ditch from the Des Plaines River to the Chicago River to drain some

land that they owned. This caused sediment to wash into the canal. A year
(4)

later, the current slowed and stopped.

Then in the summer of 1879, the Des Plaines River flooded and forced the
Chicago River back into the lake beyond the intake pipes. Chicago's citizens
were forced to boil their drinking water. The problem occurred again in 1885
and set off outbreaks of typhoid, cholera and dysentery. Out of necessity,
the state legislature created the Sanitary District of Chicago and gave it the
power to tax and issue bonds to construct a new canal that ran parallel to
the old one. The Chicago River was also deepened and widened. The new
Ship and Sanitary Canal again reversed the river. However, this time it drew
more water from the lake and had a stronger current. The water purified
itself through oxidation and dilution by the time it reached Joliet.

(5)

The shift from the filth theory of disease to germ theory began in the 1880s
as French and German scientists began to demonstrate that germs were the
real cause of disease. However, it was the turn-of-the-century before germ
theory really began to take hold and campaign for personal hygiene began
to appear. Charles V. Chapin, the health commissioner of Providence, Rhode
Island, was one of the first people to acknowledge that contagious disease,
[s]pread more among filthy people just because such persons use very little
soap and water and allow their faces, hands, belongings and dwellings to
become and remain smeared with mucus, saliva, pus and other infectious
(6)

material.

A pure and ample water supply and personal hygiene were essential to
preventing the spread of germs.
While the metropolises worked to clean themselves up, small towns and
cities tried to grow. During the nineteenth century, it was a widely held
belief that with enough capital, political manipulation, and human spirit any
town could become a great metropolis. Towns promoted themselves
relentlessly in the hopes that they would turn into a bustling center of
commerce. If a town was lucky, its promoters might acquire the county
seat, a hospital, college or some other public institution, or the railroad
might come through. Any of these could ensure the survival of the town and
increase its growth. As a result, fierce battles raged between towns for these
institutions. Lobbying, pork-barreling, and local donations of land all helped
to encourage the government or organizations to bestow these prizes on a
town.

(7)

The booster ethos that prevailed during the nineteenth century equated

social unity with progress. The collective will or public spirit of the
community as much as its geographic location and natural resources decided
its fate. Factionalism or jealousy led to failure and ruined a town's chances
for success. No one worked harder at town promotion than the editors of
local papers. Newspapers were constantly expounding on the virtues of their
town and praising the efforts of its citizens. They also pointed out the town's
failure to promote itself. More importantly, the local papers worked to
discredit their rivals and never failed to comment on their failures and
misfortunes.
In 1894, Charleston experienced a surge of this booster ethos. The
Charleston Plaindealer published a twenty-four-page souvenir edition on
December 21, 1894, which detailed the advantages of the town and
highlighted some of its more prominent businesses and citizens. Among the
advantages listed were: location, climate, schools, churches, businesses,
transportation facilities, modern houses, electric lights, water-works, and a
fire department. The editors then went on to describe the accomplishments
of the past year and concluded,
[s]ocially, religiously, municipally and commercially considered, the
advancement has been steady and universal. Each of these branches of the
(8)

municipal system are pushing vigorously and energetically forward.
Charleston was a city on the move.

At the 1893-94 annual meeting of the State Teachers' Association in
Springfield the need for more normal institutes in the state was discussed
and a committee was appointed to see that the issue was brought before the
state legislature. During the winter of 1894, bills for that purpose were
introduced in the General Assembly. Coles County Superintendent of
Schools, John L. Whisnand, actively worked to secure a school for eastern
Illinois. In February 1895, Senator Isaac Craig of Mattoon and
Representative W.H. Wallace of Humboldt introduced bills for the
(9)

establishment of an Eastern Illinois State Normal School.

At the time, Mattoon was generally considered the favorite. She was at the
crossroads of the Illinois Central and Big Four railroads, which connected her
to most of Illinois. As a result, the town's population had increased more
rapidly than Charleston's. By 1890, it had a population of 7,000 compared to
(10)

Charleston's 4,135.
Plus a politician from Mattoon had introduced the bill
for the normal school. The increasing size of Mattoon and the chance at the
normal school may have spurred some members of the town into action. As
the county seat, Charleston wanted to appear progressive. Especially since

plans for a new courthouse were being discussed and Mattoon hoped to
have the county seat moved. Charleston did not want to loose the county
seat.
Shortly after the bill was introduced in the legislature, the Charleston
Scimitar in proper booster form suggested that Charleston would be missing
an excellent opportunity if she did not enter the contest for the normal
school. (It is likely that the other city papers were also promoting this
course of action during the winter of 1894-95.) It wasn't, however, until
April 19, 1895, that the citizens of Charleston made any move on the issue.
At that time, a public meeting was held and a committee was appointed to
go to Springfield and investigate the town's chances.
On May 22, 1895, Governor Altgeld signed Senate Bill No. 148, which
allowed for the appointment of a board of trustees and the creation of an
Eastern Illinois State Normal School. Under the provisions of the law, the
donation of a site and "other valuable considerations" was required. The bill
stipulated that the site should be "not less than forty acres of ground …with
a view of obtaining a good water supply and other conveniences for the use
of the institution." It also stated that the building be "made fire-resisting,
and so constructed as to be warmed in the most healthful and economical
(11)

Both of these statements
manner, with ample ventilation in all its parts."
reflect concerns that had developed in the nineteenth century in regards to
public health and sanitation.
Obviously, the state legislature had learned from Chicago's problems with
the public water supply. Otherwise, water would not have been a primary
concern in the selection of a site for the normal school. The citizens of
Charleston were well aware of the importance of an ample and pure water
supply to the board of trustees. Several Charleston papers from the period
make reference to Sec. 10 of the law, which required good, pure water. In
fact, they emphasized the water supply when promoting Charleston. The
board was given a demonstration of the power and effectiveness of the city's
waterworks when it came to inspect potential sites for the school. Four
streams of water were thrown from the corners of the square over the
(12)

courthouse dome.

The trustees came back for a second visit in July 1895. At that time, the
normal school committee presented Charleston's offer. The offer stated that
as long as the school was located within two miles of the courthouse, the
citizens promised to donate forty acres of land to be selected from any of
the sites shown to the board; donate from $35,000 to $45,000 depending
on the value of the site selected; extend water mains to the site and supply

the school with water for fifty years at five dollars a year; build a paved or
gravel street from the courthouse to the school and provide sidewalks;
provide free freight for construction materials; furnish incandescent electric
lights to the school for twenty five years at the rate of ten cents per
thousand watts and at half the regular rate for arch lights; and provide the
school with various grades of coal for heating at fixed rates until July 1,
(13)

1901.
The selection of the location for the normal school seemed to
hinge on the water question. The trustees took water samples from the
different towns in the running for the normal school. Charleston had the best
(14)

and the purest water according to the chemist that conducted the test.
The water supply probably helped put Charleston over the top because she
(15)

offered $70,000 less than Danville and $40,000 less than Mattoon.

Testimonials that appeared in the local papers after Charleston's victory
support the importance of the water supply and a healthful site. As the
Urbana Courier stated,
[a]n analysis of the water from the competing towns showed Charleston's to
be the purest, and this, coupled with her unexcelled natural drainage, was
(16)

undoubtedly the goose that laid the golden egg.

The Announcement of the Eastern Illinois State Normal School (1899-1900)
also supports this analysis. It reiterates the importance that the board of
trustees placed on considerations of water and drainage in choosing a
location for the school. It also states that impure water and imperfect
drainage are prime factors of diseases, so provisions must be made to meet
(17)

these needs especially when large numbers of people will be present.
The lessons of nineteenth-century Chicago were not lost on the legislature
and the board of trustees.
As medical science demonstrated, disease was spread through germs and
plenty of water for washing was needed to combat them. As a result, the
board wanted not only a pure supply, but also an ample one. Charleston had
both. The report went on to extol the city's water works and the fact that it
had always provided a sufficient water supply even during dry seasons.
Mattoon could not make the same claim. During 1895, the city's reservoir
failed to maintain a sufficient supply of water. In fact, at the time of the
trustees' visit to collect water samples, there was a drought and Charleston
was furnishing part of Mattoon's water. The citizens of Charleston also
helped their case by using water liberally to demonstrate the abundance of
their water supply.

(18)

The city of Charleston gave the board of trustees ten sites to choose from
for the location of the school. The trustees examined the different sites
when they visited Charleston in June of 1895. The sites were not equal in
the eyes of the citizens of Charleston. If two of the sites were selected, the
donation from the community would be $37,000 rather than $40,000. If two
(19)

other sites were selected, the payment would only be $35,000.
Unfortunately, Coleman's book does not contain the map of the sites that
went with the city's proposal and the original document has not been found,
so it was impossible to determine exactly which sites these were. It is
possible however, to reconstruct the ten sites and make some deductions as
to why the present site was chosen.
Three of the sites were north of town. J.K. Decker owned two of these sites.
One of them had a spring on it. A stream ran through the area and it was
wooded. The third site was the Craig forty, which was a mile north of town.
These three pieces of property were north and west of the Big Four and
Clover Leaf Railroad tracks. According to the 1894 Charleston Plaindealer,
this was the industrial section of Charleston. While the three sites may have
been picturesque, they would have been subject to the noise, soot, and
grime from the railroad and other industry. More importantly, placing the
normal school north of town would not necessarily have brought the
students into Charleston. The school was expected to bring several hundred
students and visitors to Charleston. The businessmen of Charleston wanted
these people to go through the business district and spend money. This was
more likely to happen if the school was located south of the railroad.
The county fairground offered a nice setting with many large trees. It is
unlikely, however, that the citizens of Charleston wanted to give up the
fairground unless it was absolutely necessary. From the 1893 plat map, it
also appears that the fairground was not 40 acres, which was one of the
stipulations from the legislature.
Three more of the sites were on the eastern edge of Charleston. One of
these was Trower Park at the end of Jackson Street. However, in examining
the 1893 plat map, it also does not appear to be forty acres. The other two
sites were the Dunbar forty and the Reat place across the road. These sites
met the requirements stipulated in the enabling legislation. They would
bring students and visitors through the business district of Charleston.
However, there is nothing extraordinary about them.
The three remaining sites were all on the southern edge of town. They were
the Wiley tract, the C.E. Bishop site and a piece of land belonging to Mr.
Bishop and Monroe White at the foot of Tenth Street. A location at the

southern edge of town removed the school from the dirt, grime, and heavy
industry of Charleston, especially because the prevailing winds tend to come
from the south and east. It also brought students and visitors through the
business district and past the homes of the leading citizens of Charleston.
This was important to the business and community leaders of Charleston as
they wanted to be seen as a progressive and growing town. The Plaindealer
made a point of describing Charleston as "[a] city of modern houses,
exerting the best social and religious influences." It also mentioned the
remodeling that had taken place in the business blocks of the city. The new
buildings conformed to the styles of the day with plate glass front windows
(20)

The business leaders also hoped to attract
and a substantial appearance.
the business of the students and visitors passing through Charleston.
The C.E. Bishop site was the one eventually chosen by the Board of
Trustees. It sat at the base of Sixth Street. It was a wooded area with a
pond and was used by the town for picnicking. Interestingly enough, the
Charleston Scimitar had suggested that this hill south of town would be an
(21)

excellent site for the normal school in May of 1894.
Governor Altgeld
described the virtues of the site in his speech at the laying of the
cornerstone.
Neither geographical location nor other accidental circumstances has caused
the concentration of great corporate wealth in our midst or promoted the
building of mighty cities. On the other hand you have escaped the intensified
form of vice, misery and disintegration of society that are peculiar to centers
of population. Dollars may grow in cities but men grow nearer to nature….
The nearer we get to nature the higher we rise in the conception of the
(22)

world. Here is the place to found schools and academies.

The picturesque surroundings fit in well with the idea that nature was a
place for contemplation and thought. Nature also uplifted the spirit and
improved the moral character of the individual. It stood in direct opposition
to the inherent vice of cities. All of these characteristics were necessities for
an institution of learning.
This particular location also allowed the community leaders to apply the
tenets of the "White City," whether it was done consciously or unconsciously
on a much smaller scale. The location of the normal school and the
courthouse created the perfect vistas, especially since a new courthouse was
going to be constructed. Each was to be constructed on a small hill. Running
bewtween the square and the normal school site are Sixth and Seventh
Street, which at this time were lined with the homes of many of the leading
citizens of Charleston. The lots were large and the homes were a mix of late

nineteenth century styles. All of the homes had barns and other outbuildings
behind them. Large trees graced the area. While not lining the edge of the
street as Olmsted and others proposed, they did shade the area and give it
the aura of a parkway.
This central axis through Charleston resembles the central axis that
Burnham and Root created at the World's Fair. The courthouse and the
normal school replace the Administration building and the Peristyles. Sixth
and Seventh Streets with their grand homes take the place of the buildings
along the Court of Honor. The picturesque surroundings of the normal school
and the homes also hint at the landscaping of the fairgrounds. The link
between the civic and the cultural exemplified the order and harmony that
the "White City" strove to create in an industrialized society. It was repeated
in many city plans during this time, including Burnham's Plan for Chicago.
City plans that came out of the World's Fair also placed monumental
structures at the entrances to the city. The location of the courthouse and
the normal school serve that function in Charleston. The normal school
building would have been an imposing sight for anyone entering Charleston
on the road from Mattoon. The courthouse would create an equally imposing
site to visitors that arrived by train and were brought by cab into town.
While not Neoclassical, the Gothic style with Romanesque elements of the
normal school building and the Romanesque style of the courthouse gave
the vistas an overall sense of order and harmony.
The normal school arrived in Charleston as the result of the boosterism of its
community leaders and of the public health concerns of the state legislature
and the board of trustees. The site chosen by the board of trustees
exemplified the picturesque qualities of nature that provide for
contemplation and virtuous edification of the spirit. It also provided
Charleston with a central axis that linked the school to the business center
of town. Like many other projects throughout the nation, the changes in
Charleston espoused the ideals set forth at the 1893 World's Columbian
Exposition and demonstrated the progressive nature of the community.
1. M. Christin Boyer, Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning (Cambridge, MA,
1983), 3, 34.
2. Suellen Hoy, Chasing Dirt: The American Pursuit of Cleanliness (New York, 1995), 60, 64.
3. Donald L. Miller, City of the Century: The Epic of Chicago and the Making of America (New York, 1996),
124-9.
4. Ibid., 130-1.
5. Ibid., 424.
6. Suellen Hoy, Chasing Dirt, 107.

7. Don Harrison Doyle, The Social Order of a Frontier Community: Jacksonville, Illinois, 1825-70 (Urbana,
1978), 18.
8. Charleston (IL) Plaindealer, souvenir ed., Dec. 21, 1894, 6.
9. Charleston (IL) Courier, May 28, 1896.
10. These figures are from the 1890 Federal Census.
11. "An Act to establish and maintain the Eastern Illinois State Normal School," May 22, 1895, Illinois
General Assembly, Section 10 and 11, University Archives, Booth Library, Eastern Illinois University.
12. "The Story of a Great Success," Charleston (IL) Scimitar, May 29, 1896.
13. R.S. Hodgen, Geo. R. Chambers, Isaiah H. Johnson, "To the Board of Trustees of the Eastern Illinois
State Normal School," University Archives, Booth Library, Eastern Illinois University.
14. Charleston (IL) Plaindealer, Aug. 29, 1899, 1.
15. "Charleston Gets It. The New Reform School Located at Catfishville," Mattoon (IL) Weekly Gazette,
Sept. 13, 1895.
16. "Unsolicited Testimonials," Charleston (IL) Scimitar, Sept. 20, 1895.
17. Announcement of the Eastern Illinois State Normal School at Charleston [1899-1900], n.p.
18. Charleston (IL) Plaindealer, Aug. 29, 1899, 1.
19. Charles Coleman, Eastern Illinois State College: Fifty years of Public Service, Charleston, Eastern
Illinois State College Bulletin, 189 (Jan. 1, 1950), 19.
20. Charleston (IL) Plaindealer, Dec. 21, 1894, 4.
21. Charleston (IL) Scimitar, May 29, 1896, 1.
22. Charleston ( IL) Courier, May, 28, 1896.

Speaking Out: The Role of the Press in the Suffrage Movement

Elicia Slate

Elicia is a senior undergraduate history major who wrote this article for Dr.
Pete Voelz's History of American Journalism. This past year she also wrote a
paper on "Royal Bastards," about illegitimacy at the late-Stuart Court, and
she delivered a paper on that subject at the Phi Alpha Theta Southern
Illinois Regional Conference at Carbondale in April.

The fight for suffrage was an important movement for women, and the press
proved valuable to the cause. Both male and female journalists wrote in
support of suffrage and against it. Various newspapers and journals were
created in the struggle for rights. Most of these publications come from the
nineteenth century when the suffrage movement was decades away from
achieving its goals. These publications strove to inform and to motivate and
are a lasting testimony to those who spoke out for equality.
The first "acknowledged ...'feminist' newspaper to spring from the fledgling
(1)

woman's rights movement of the nineteenth century" was the Una.
Paulina Kellogg Wright Davis in Rhode Island created this groundbreaking
newspaper in February of 1853. The Una was designed to speak to the "real
(2)

women" of all classes.
In June 1853, the paper voiced its dedication to
the cause. "We ask to be regarded, respected, and treated as human
beings, of full age and natural abilities, as equal sinners, and not as infants
or beautiful angels, to whom the rules of civil and social justice do not
(3)

apply."
The women who ran the newspaper saw women as an "oppressed
group," and they believed that women should know the truth about their
condition. William Lloyd Garrison wrote in the July 1853 issue about "the
irony of allowing women to 'sing' but not to 'speak' that 'our Redeemer
livith.'"

(4)

The Una, which sold for $1, counted women's rights activists such as Lucy
Stone, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Coffin Mott, Susan B. Anthony,
William Lloyd Garrison, and Elizabeth Blackwell among its subscribers.

Unfortunately, the newspaper that was directed towards all women began to
deal more and more with the issues of the wealthy, well-educated white
woman.

(5)

This proved to be the downfall of the Una.

The Una was not the only paper devoted to women's equal rights. The
Revolution occupied "an important place in the history of suffrage journalism
(6)

and the feminist struggle."
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony
published this paper from 1868-1870. In one edition, Julia Ward Howe wrote
imploring "our sisters…to make common cause with us" to organize not
(7)

"against men" but "against superstition."
In addition to equal rights, the
paper also dealt with divorce and prostitution.
Cady Stanton and Anthony had printed 10,000 copies of The Revolution's
first issue. It received mixed reviews. The Daily Times deemed it "readable,
well-edited and instructive" and the Chicago Times praised it as a "readable
sheet, well printed and well written, bold and independent." In another
favorable review the Providence Press said that "the editors of The
Revolution 'have an irrepressible spirit, and if they do not produce a
revolution it will be the first time that justice and freedom persistently set
forth fail of accomplishing a grand result.'" But the Daily Times wrote that
"The Revolution's ideas were impracticable" and the New York Times said
that the paper "was a victim of illogical thinking and that its motto was
'meaningless and foolish.'"
the editors.

(8)

However, these negative reviews did not deter

The Revolution strove to not only "complain about suffrage" but to actively
promote the vote. The publication was too revolutionary for some people
and it experienced financial difficulties. Horace Greeley and Wendell Phillips
ignored the paper because they felt that it was not conservative enough.
The paper was never well off financially. The original subscription price of
$2, and later $3, was not enough to sustain the publication. The final blow
to The Revolution was the founding of a rival paper, the Woman's Journal.
The Revolution was eventually sold for $1 in 1870 and then sold again to the
New York Christian Enquirer.

(9)

The paper that helped to end The Revolution was conservative in nature.
The Woman's Journal has been referred to as "'The Suffrage Bible'" and
(10)

"'The Torchbearer of the Woman Suffrage Cause.'"
The paper included
regular columns, gossip, humor, poetry, letters, and a section about
children. The less abrasive nature of this paper probably helped it to attract
a larger readership than other papers that were radical in nature. The

Woman's Journal "stood as a beacon of feminist respectability, charting a
course of protest between an oppressive status quo and an abrasive
(11)

radicalism."
This publication relied on raising consciousness in a way
that was intimate and established a relationship between the reader and the
paper. This relationship was also another factor in favor of this publication
over other publications such as The Una. The editors wanted to prescribe,
mobilize, and maintain courses of action while broadening intellectual
horizons. In the end, the Woman's Journal became a means by which the
conservative branch of the women's suffrage struggle discharged important
functions.

(12)

The Una, The Revolution, and the Woman's Journal were not the only three
equal rights newspapers. In Louisiana, Mrs. Ida Porter Boyer edited a
suffrage paper called the Southern Citizen. Other newspapers that supported
suffrage included the Woman's Tribune, Woman's Column, Farmer's Wife,
and the Woman's Exponent. Sherilyn Cox Bennison found "at least 12
suffrage newspapers in the American West, all edited by women from 1869
until 1914." These newspapers featured reports on meetings, speech
reprints, rebuttals, and arguments for rights. The suffrage papers and
journals proved valuable in uniting women by bridging "the gaps of time and
distance ...across the country" and helped them form the ties that created a
social movement. According to scholar Linda Steiner, the suffrage press
helped women to evolve "intellectually and emotionally" by "satisfying
(13)

communal models for acting, thinking, judging and feeling."

There were other ways that publications could support suffrage without
becoming suffrage papers. Other newspapers dedicated portions of their
publications to the suffrage cause. The Atlanta Constitution created a
woman suffrage department in July of 1913. The Atlanta Journal and the
Columbus Ledger each published a weekly suffrage column for several years
and, in 1914, the Atlanta Georgian and the Ledger published special suffrage
(14)

issues.
Some non-suffrage papers had staff members that were assigned
to the suffrage cause. In this way the newspapers could support the suffrage
cause while still providing their previous services. This combination of
suffrage and non-suffrage issues probably assisted the cause. Readers
drawn to the news might find themselves reading about suffrage and might
become interested in the movement. Emma Bugbee covered the suffrage
movement for the New York Tribune.

(15)

Bugbee went to suffrage groups to

(16)

get news from the organization heads.
The Equal Suffrage Party
reported in 1915 that "forty-five papers had signified their willingness to

(17)

publish suffrage news."

Not all papers were supportive. The New York Herald called participants in
an 1853 National Woman's Rights Convention "unsexed in mind" and the
(18)

convention itself, the "Woman's Wrong Convention."
Supportive papers
attempted to counteract the negative press and to allow women a chance to
(19)

consider ideas and arguments for themselves.
not deter the suffrage papers from their cause.

These negative papers did

In addition to newspapers and journals, supporters of women's suffrage
disseminated their ideas in other ways. Leaflets and pro-suffrage pamphlets
were common. Mabel Craft Deering, suffrage press chairman for California,
wrote a report on the important role that press work played in the suffrage
movement. She felt that her most important contribution to the suffrage
movement was her presswork. Her report became a "readable guide for
(20)

suffrage campaigners" in other states.

The press helped the suffrage movement immensely. Through various
newspapers and journals, as well as leaflets and pamphlets, the message of
suffrage was disseminated. Cady Stanton wrote that "once enfranchised,
women could vote in legislation that would protect the home and
(21)

family."
Her words served to inspire women and to "inform" them that it
was their duty to work for suffrage. Finally, "by presenting public issues to
their readers, these newspapers subtly but effectively encouraged women to
think of themselves as competent, sensible, potentially important persons
and to perceive themselves as members of a group with common problems
(22)

and concerns."

The pro-suffrage publications served to unite supporters of the cause. The
newspapers and journals helped to create organizations such as the National
Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) and the American Woman Suffrage
(23)

The suffrage publications served as a means of
Association (AWSA).
attracting members and supporters. Despite the fact that these publications
began early in the movement, the struggle for rights would have been even
more difficult without them. They helped to initiate the movement and to
spread its message.
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Texas Bandits: A Study of the 1948 Democratic Primary

Jason Matteson

Jason, an undergraduate history major, wrote this narrative of a
th

20 -century political campaign and its implications for Dr. Mark White's
upper division course on America in the sixties.

Lyndon Johnson ranks among the most skilled and productive politicians in
United States history. From 1937 till his last day as President in 1969,
Johnson introduced, sponsored, or supported much of the most important
legislation of the twentieth century. In 1948 though, Johnson's political
career came a mere 87 votes away from an abrupt end. In one of the most
studied elections in United States history, Johnson's star rose from the
House of Representatives, in which he had been an energetic and effective
(1)

member for 11 years, to a post in the more powerful Senate.
If he lost his
Senate bid in 1948, he planned to return to Texas to devote time to KTBC,
(2)

the radio station that he and Lady Bird owned.
Johnson ran for the
Senate in 1941, with his House seat as insurance, after Senator Morris
Sheppard died of a brain hemorrhage. But the stakes in 1948 seemed much
higher as he would have to give up his seat in the House of Representatives
to run. In 1948, Lyndon Johnson unleashed an aggressive, modern, and
crooked campaign because his political career stood in the balance.
In 1941, Johnson led by 5,000 votes through a count of 96% of the ballots.
(3)

He ended up losing by 1,311.
From his defeat, Johnson learned a few
very important lessons. First, he realized that being labeled a strong New
Dealer probably hampered more than it helped him. For the most part,
Texans outside the poorer hill country disliked FDR and the sweeping liberal
change he brought in the 1930s. When Johnson announced his 1941
candidacy on the steps of the White House, the picture did not sit well with
(4)

most Texans.

In 1948, Johnson knew that if he was going to win a statewide race, he
would have to shift right. Democrats had traditionally controlled Texas.
When the national Democratic agenda shifted to the left in the 1930s, Texas

Democrats, along with other southern Democrats, did not follow. Even
though the Democrats controlled the state, it remained conservative. In
1948, Johnson did not stress the New Deal programs. He now talked about
issues in a way that catered to Texans.
He began his conservative switch in 1947 when he voted for the anti-labor
Taft-Hartley Act; legislation that significantly set back the power unions
gained in the 1930s. When President Truman attempted to veto the bill,
Johnson joined in the coalition to override it. Through this bill, Johnson
accomplished two important goals in preparation for his 1948 Senate run.
He demonstrated his willingness to take a stand against what he deemed as
union excesses, and, "with Truman considered a sure loser in 1948" because
of his civil rights proposals, he separated himself from the President's liberal
(5)

administration.

Johnson also took a more conservative position that appeared to be anti-civil
rights. By criticizing Truman's legislation, he hoped to endear himself to
Texas voters. He argued:
It is the province of the state to run its own elections [an argument against
ending poll tax]. I am opposed to the anti-lynching bill because the federal
government has no more business enacting a law against one form of
murder than another. I am against the FEPC (Fair Employment Practices
Commission) because if a man can tell you whom you must hire, he can tell
(6)

you whom you cannot employ.

He also disagreed with Truman on an issue that was especially important to
Texans: control of the tideland oil off the coast of Texas in the Gulf of
Mexico. Johnson supported state control, whereas Truman, and other big
government liberals felt federal control of these valuable resources was
best.
LBJ, being the consummate politician, knew how to maneuver. He knew he
would have to mirror, to some degree, the conservative nature of his
opponent, Coke Stevenson, if he was going to compete with one of the most
popular politicians in Texas history. Stevenson, Robert Caro notes, "had run
for public office twelve times-once for County Judge, five times for state
legislator, twice for Speaker, twice for Lieutenant Governor and twice for
(7)

One Texas state legislator
Governor-and he had never been defeated."
said, "Coke Stevenson was just like Coca-Cola." Stevenson was certainly not
a man who actively sought public office. He had spent all of 1947 at home
on his ranch, and it took the urging of his political friends to convince him to
run for the Senate in 1948. He projected the image of the strong, silent

type-a political oddity who did not speak unless asked a question. His ultraconservative political philosophy suited most Texans: lowering of taxes,
reduction of federal control within the state, promotion of a freer market,
(8)

and "complete destruction of the Communist movement in this country."
Liberal critics would often argue that Stevenson was too conservative. They
said that he made the deficit he inherited as Governor in 1941 a surplus by
1947, because he slashed state services. They called him a racist because
he opposed black voting rights and did nothing to stop wartime lynching in
cities like Texarkana. He was labeled an isolationist because he opposed the
(9)

Marshall Plan and often called European nations "beggars."

LBJ made use of these views in his campaign against Stevenson. Johnson's
mantra throughout the campaign was "Preparedness, Peace, and
(10)

Progress."
By "preparedness," he meant increasing the military might of
the United States. In 1948, the threat of communism frightened many
Americans. The Soviets had solidified their control of Eastern Europe; the
United States was caught in a face-off over West Berlin; in China, the
Communists were prevailing over the Nationalists; and the Alger Hiss spy
(11)

ring made Americans realize communism remained at their backdoor.
Johnson made Stevenson's isolationism a key point in his campaign by
associating it with communism. He often brought up the contemporary
example of Chamberlain appeasing Hitler to demonstrate how an unchecked
(12)

By "peace," LBJ meant supporting
evil would only grow more powerful.
the United Nations and international trade. This, of course, went against
Stevenson's anti-U.N., anti-Marshall Plan stance, and it was another attack
upon his isolationist philosophy. And by "progress," LBJ stuck by some of his
New Deal guns by supporting subsidies for farmers, electricity in rural areas,
conservation, education, an increase in social security benefits, an increase
in the number of hospitals, and protection of labor through a minimum wage
(13)

This platform, particularly his stance on
and humane working hours.
labor, demonstrates how Johnson was adept at playing both sides of the
political fence in order to latch onto as many votes as possible. He gave the
Texas liberals his "progress" agenda, while he catered to conservatives in
helping defeat Truman's civil rights legislation and helping pass and uphold
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Ultimately, the candidates views on
communism and labor proved to be the most important issues. Stevenson's
silent nature and rigid isolationism would be a hindrance, especially with the
new type of campaign LBJ would run.
In his 1942 and 1944 primary campaigns for Governor, Stevenson had won
by record-setting margins and avoided run-offs. But his campaign against

Johnson was a different matter. Running as an isolationist for a Senate seat
(14)

was not the same as running for Governor.

The primary election was scheduled for July 24. Stevenson felt he would win
a majority of the votes and not have to worry about a run-off election. He
enjoyed an enormous lead in the early polls, and he felt his popularity alone
would carry him through. LBJ, of course, just hoped that he and the
numerous other candidates could keep this from happening. Johnson was
aided immensely by the number three candidate was George Peddy. Peddy
was a "symbol of uncompromising conservatism," and was a veteran of both
world wars and an ardent anti-communist who believed that the state
(15)

should own and control the tideland oil supply.
With views mirroring
those of Stevenson, there was little doubt that Peddy would take a lot of
votes away from the former Governor. Peddy's entry into the race concerned
Stevenson so much that he made it a priority to convince Peddy people to
avoid the run-off between Johnson and himself (as only the two leading
vote-getters would participate in a run-off) by voting for Stevenson on July
24.
Unfortunately for Stevenson, Peddy and his people only stepped up their
campaign efforts and increased his poll share to 14.5% by July 21. In the
election, three days later, Stevenson ended up with 477,077 votes (40%)
and won 168 counties. Johnson garnered 405,617 votes (34%) and won 72
(16)

For
counties. Peddy surprised all by capturing 237,195 votes (20%).
Johnson, these were both good and bad election results. They were good,
because he and Stevenson would both go into a run-off primary election.
They were bad, because he now knew that he would have to win more than
70% of the 237,195 conservative Peddy votes; votes that would more likely
go to the conservative Stevenson. But LBJ pressed on with only five weeks
to change voters' minds.
With this daunting task ahead of him, Johnson stepped up his new,
"modern" campaign with an incredible drive. The campaign contained
multiple facets. The first facet was Johnson's means of meeting with the
voters. Since June, he had used a new type of aircraft, a helicopter, to talk
to and dazzle as many Texans as he could in the short amount of time he
had. He dubbed the machine "the Johnson City Windmill." A reporter named
Margaret Mayer said:
Coming down on those rural people in those little towns who had never seen
anything like it, with that tremendous roar and the dust swirling up, it was
an awesome thing. As it was approaching, there was a lot of hurry-up:
late-comers rushing to get there. But as it actually started to come down,

(17)

there was silence-the silence of awe.

People would come from miles around to see it. Word often got around
through the distribution of flyers by an advanced party that included the
Beau Jesters-a barbershop quartet. During his five-week helicopter
campaign, Johnson made roughly 370 landings in mostly rural areas. He
(18)

even landed in north Texas one time during a Coke Stevenson speech!
Robert Dalleck estimated that Johnson reached well over 175,000 rural
(19)

voters during this helicopter campaign.
His brother and campaign
assistant, Sam Houston Johnson, gave a telling example of the value of this
technological display:
One old man in Kickapoo kept staring at Lyndon as he talked about farm
prices, never hearing a word. Finally he turned to his wife and said, "If he
can keep that damn thing from chopping his head off, he might make a good
(20)

senator."

Besides the helicopter, Johnson used other avenues on unprecedented
(21)

scales. LBJ's efforts produced the "first modern mass media campaign."
Johnson would go on to spend more money than anyone ever had on
polling, billboards, newspaper ads, radio spots, and mailings. He regularly
mailed his Johnson Journal to thousands of rural voters. In articles like
"Communists favor Coke," he painted a picture of Stevenson as a pawn of
(22)

northern Communist labor bosses because he favored isolationism.
Johnson also followed polls closely. In an average campaign, a candidate
might only conduct three or four statewide polls, because they cost so much
at $6,000 each. Johnson had them conducted by two or three firms once a
week! He also used his knowledge of radio in a very productive way. Prior to
1948, political radio consisted of nothing more than speeches. From his
experience at his radio station (KTBC), he knew more could be accomplished
with the medium. Aside from speeches, he produced shows with clever
scripts, music, and professional direction aimed at his positive points and
Stevenson's negative points. Like polling, radio proved very expensive. A
single statewide broadcast cost $5,000 to $8,000. LBJ performed a
(23)

statewide broadcast nearly every day!

Stevenson's campaign looked nothing like LBJ's; it appeared, like
Stevenson, old-fashioned. He felt that, because he was popular, spending
excessive amounts on a campaign would seem wasteful, so he did very
little. He delivered occasional radio addresses and purchased some full-page
newspaper ads and billboard space. But the crux of his campaign was built

on driving from county to county in an old Plymouth to talk to small
gatherings of people at county courthouses. Although he probably reached
as many as Johnson did on his helicopter campaign, he really showed little
(24)

organization and lacked a solid agenda.
In other words, without the
physical effort or willingness to spend money like LBJ, Stevenson's campaign
proved lackluster at best.
The striking difference in campaign costs acted therefore as an issue in
itself. Texas campaign laws permitted candidates themselves to spend up to
$10,000 in a party primary election, $8,000 initially and $2,000 in a run-off.
Obviously, more was spent through both legitimate and dubious
organizations and campaign committees such as, the "Dallas Veterans for
Johnson" or the"Johnson-for-Senate" committee. Johnson's phone bills alone
for the campaign exceeded $30,000! He received much of his campaign
money from the likes of millionaire publishers, businessmen, and private
oilmen. He even received backing from movie studio executives like George
Skouras of Twentieth Century-Fox and Howard Hughes of RKO. But most of
LBJ's campaign was funded by the brothers George and Herman Brown, who
LBJ, as a Representative, had help attain major shipbuilding contracts during
World War II. In 1946, he again helped them receive a $21,000,000
contract to build the navy and airforce bases on Guam. With LBJ in
(25)

As they
Congress, their net worth increased five-fold in a single decade!
had done in 1941, they gave LBJ anything he needed. Stevenson campaigns
were always adequately financed, but as a conservative rule of thumb,
Stevenson felt the cost of a statewide campaign should never exceed
$100,000. LBJ's campaigns always proved to be expensive. His 1937 House
campaign was one of the most expensive in Texas history; in 1941, he spent
(26)

even more.

In 1948, he went on to spend in excess of a million dollars!

Another secret to LBJ's 1948 success, was his determination and energy.
During a two-month period, Johnson made more than 350 speeches and
worked an average of 18 hours a day on the campaign. From the middle of
(27)

June to the end of July, he lost more than 25 pounds.
He campaigned so
intensely that, "his voice fell to a croak and his body ...shrank so much that
his face became a caricature of itself."

(28)

The most famous example of his will to win was his reluctance to have
painful kidney stones removed for fear he would lose precious campaign
time. He first realized that he had the stones around the time he entered the
race in early-May. He had them before and passed them. But each day, the
pain and nausea only intensified. With doctors advising surgery and the

primary election only a few months away, Johnson refused the operation
and took pain-killers regularly. By mid-May, he was enduring fever and chill
cycles that saw his temperature rise to 104 degrees. He went through six or
seven shirts a day, but he never missed a public appearance or left a room
(29)

until the last hand was shaken.

By May 27, the stones had still not passed. After doctors all but demanded
he received treatment, he agreed to go to the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota for a
new treatment that would get rid of the stones and allow him to get back on
the campaign trail within a week. He agreed to go on the condition that his
out-of-state treatment not be released to the press. He worried that Texans
(30)

would resent him for leaving Texas for treatment.
On May 30, the
experimental treatment, cystoscopic manipulation (removing the stones
through the urethra), was performed successfully. In recovery, Johnson kept
staffers and three phones in his room at all times. He still worked on his
(31)

campaign in the hospital, calling Texas as many as 64 times in one day!
Within a week, he returned to Texas, campaigning harder than ever.

The most infamous issue surrounding Johnson's 1948 victory was the
tainted vote totals in south Texas that, more than anything else, won the
election for him. The second lesson Johnson learned from his 1941 defeat
came into play here. He knew ballot tampering played a big role in his losing
by 1,311 votes to Pappy O'Daniel. Aside from shifting right politically, LBJ
also learned that he must sit on the ballot boxes in as many counties as
possible. He knew Stevenson would try to stuff the ballot boxes like O'Daniel
did, so Johnson not only ordered his men to watch the voting stations but
also instructed his men to outdo Stevenson's men in accumulating
fraudulent votes. The run-off election was scheduled for Saturday, August
28. That evening, Stevenson led by 2,119 after 939,468 votes were
counted. By 9:00 AM, Sunday, LBJ had gained the lead after 979,877 votes
were counted. By Monday evening, Stevenson regained the lead, and on
Thursday, September 2, he was announced as the "official" winner by 362
votes.
Unlike Stevenson, Johnson had prepared for a close race, and besides
having his men watch the voting stations for stuffing or withholding, he
asked election officials that supported him, like boss George Parr, to
withhold their vote totals until the official results were announced.
Stevenson was no amateur; he realized Johnson might try to pull
something. But he made a mistake in instructing his supporters to only
(32)

Johnson ordered his men to watch
watch the voting stations on Sunday.
the stations the entire week. According to H.Y. Price, a Johnson campaign

insider, LBJ went so far as to tap Stevenson's phones. Anytime Stevenson or
his men called the stations and asked for votes, LBJ immediately called his
watchmen and told them to be on their toes.
After the "official" results were announced on Thursday, the real conspiracy
began. Early on Friday, September 3, election officials in a little southern
Mexican-American town, dominated by George Parr, announced that the
returns they released earlier in the week were incorrect. Officials in Alice,
said they found an additional 203 ballots in their "Box 13." Of these 203
ballots, 202 were for Johnson, leaving only one for Stevenson! Officials from
another Parr-dominated county-Duval-also announced that they had some
(33)

ballots that were not included in their tally from earlier in the week.
After these votes had been counted, LBJ had 87 more votes than Stevenson
with a final tally of 494,191 to 494,104.
Of course, this sudden change was no accident. Voting stations in many
south Texas counties were controlled by Parr. During Stevenson's three
gubernatorial bids, Parr had supported him with large margins like he did
with Johnson in 1948. But in 1944, Stevenson made a questionable decision.
Parr had asked Stevenson to appoint Jimmy Kazen, a personal and political
friend, to the position of District Attorney of Laredo County. Instead, at a
military official's request, Stevenson appointed S. Truman Phelps to the
(34)

Parr
position to clean up prostitution around the Laredo airforce base.
never forgave Stevenson. Besides, Parr liked LBJ because of his style and
courage. Also, in 1946, Johnson had helped Parr receive a pardon for
(35)

income tax evasion.

Stevenson, of course, was outraged and rightfully declared that LBJ's votes
were fraudulent. Johnson countered with claims, also probably accurate,
that many of Stevenson's votes were fraudulent. Stevenson initially sought
justice with the state Democratic Executive Committee. After a debate that
included many harsh accusations, the Committee agreed fraud played a part
on both sides but awarded the election to Johnson by a vote of 29 to 28.
The deciding vote was placed by Charley Gibson, a drunk committee
(36)

With a
member rushed in at the last minute by Johnson supporters.
party convention dominated by Truman Democrats, assuring Johnson of
another sure victory, Stevenson realized that he would now have to seek
justice through the courts.
On September 15, Stevenson sent representatives to the residence of T.
Whitfield Davidson, a Federal District Judge in north Texas. The Stevenson
men asked Davidson to place a restraining order on LBJ's inclusion on the

November ballot. To validate seeking justice in the federal courts, Stevenson
claimed that the election fraud violated his federal civil rights. Besides, a
statewide recount would take too long for Stevenson to have a chance at
being included on the November ballot. Davidson issued the order and
scheduled a hearing for September 21 in Fort Worth. LBJ knew Davidson
was conservative and a friend of Stevenson, but more than that political
conflict, he did not understand why he was being treated as if he were guilty
before the trial even occurred. He also felt that a statewide election fell
under the jurisdiction of the state courts-not the federal courts.
Initially, Johnson's lawyers suggested an appeal to Chief Justice Fred Vinson,
but it was too risky. Vinson could rule against Johnson, and there would still
be time for Stevenson's placement on the November ballot. So, Johnson
prepared for his Federal District Court appearance. By September 18, LBJ
had hired the brilliant Washington, D.C., super-attorney Abe Fortas. Fortas
realized that Johnson needed the quickest and most reasonable course of
action possible, so he decided to appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
(37)

Knowing that
in Atlanta immediately after the September 21 hearing.
the Fifth Circuit was in recess till mid-October, Fortas felt strongly that
Justice Hugo Black, the liberal senior justice for the area that included
(38)

Texas, would be compelled to review the case and make a decision.

At the September 21 hearing, Judge Davidson made the temporary
restraining order permanent and ordered the investigation of election results
in the southern counties of Duval, Zapata, and Jim Wells. The Johnson team,
following their plan, quickly issued an appeal to Judge Joseph Hutchinson of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on September 24 in New Orleans. Like
Fortas had predicted, the Court would not be able to hear the case until
October 14. So, on September 25, Fortas submitted the case to Justice
Black in Washington. Black agreed to hear the case if attorneys for both
(39)

parties could be present on September 28.

In the meantime, the investigative hearings that Judge Davidson ordered
where set to begin on September 27. Davidson ordered the investigation of
the three counties because of their peculiar returns. For instance, Duval
county saw 99.4% of its ballots go for LBJ! During the investigation, county
officials made it difficult to obtain poll tax records and tally sheets.
Witnesses proved hard to come by, and much of the potential evidence had
(40)

Also quite bizarre was the fact that the final 203 names on
disappeared.
the Jim Wells County's "Box 13" tally sheet were in a different color of ink
and in a different handwriting than the previous thousand on the sheet.
Strangely, they were also all in alphabetical order, like someone had just

gone down the poll tax sheet and copied names down. Of the 203, "lastminute" voters at "Box 13," only 11 were located and questioned. All said
(41)

they had not even voted!

At any rate, the day after the investigation began, Justice Black heard both
cases and sided with the Johnson camp by lifting the restraining order.
Without much hesitation, Black passed down the ruling that Johnson's civil
rights had been violated through his removal from the November election
after the electorate of Texas had chosen him as the Democratic candidate.
Anyway, Black said Stevenson should have first brought a voter fraud suit to
a state court or even the United States Senate itself, "which has the right to
(42)

determine its own membership."

With a decision from the Supreme Court, Stevenson was finished, but a
mystery lingers: who or what influenced Black's speedy, subjective decision?
Some believe either the Texan Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, or Abe
Fortas may have discussed the case and its repercussions with Black. Black's
personal political ideology could have been the overwhelming factor. Robert
Dalleck put forth the theory that Attorney General Tom Clark had a lot to do
with it. Clark actively supported Johnson in the primaries by talking a few
(43)

Clark
New York law firms into donating money to the Johnson campaign.
probably would not have wanted his efforts to be in vain. With his position
as both the head of the Justice Department and a strong Johnson supporter,
Clark had both the means and the motive. Others like Rowland Evans,
Robert Novak, and Ronnie Dugger felt that President Truman played a
pivotal role.
The full weight of the Truman Administration and the entire liberal wing of
the Democratic party now was thrown behind Johnson. For all his
conservative transgressions during the 80th Congress, Lyndon Johnson was
(44)

indefinitely preferable to Dixiecrat Coke Stevenson in the Senate.

On September 25, three days before the Black ruling, LBJ met with Truman
on the President's whistle-stop campaign tour of Texas. It is impossible to
know exactly what was said, but Johnson did immediately turn to
Truman-the man he had opposed on so many issues in the previous couple
(45)

years-to help raise campaign money after Black's decision.

Interestingly, Johnson never admitted to any wrongdoing in the election, but
in an interview with Ronnie Dugger in the early-1970s, Johnson shocked
Dugger by showing him a picture of the Jim Wells County officials smiling
and holding the Precinct 13 ballot box. When Dugger asked what it meant

and how Johnson had received it, LBJ said nothing and grinned. A few years
later, Dugger interviewed Luis Salas-a Parr man and the head official at
Precinct 13 in 1948. Salas admitted the late returns were fraudulent. Then
Dugger was shocked when Salas pulled out a photograph-the same
(46)

photograph LBJ had shown him a few years earlier!

The subsequent November election proved to be a mere formality. Johnson
easily defeated the Republican candidate, Jack Porter, by a margin of more
(47)

than two to one.
So by a margin of 87 (likely illegal) votes in the
primary run-off, Lyndon Johnson's political career reached its next level.
Students of history can only wonder: if Johnson had lost, would there have
ever been full-scale American involvement in Vietnam through which 58,000
young Americans would die, or would the important legislative leaps of the
1960s ever have occurred? The year 1948 contains a moment that may very
well have been the difference. Of course, the 1948 election did nothing to
alleviate LBJ's all-consuming feeling of insecurity-it only added to it. He had
grown up poor and attended a modest teachers' college. He had been
defeated in his 1941 Senate attempt, and now, the future of this political
(48)

The jeers of "Landslide Lyndon"
giant "rested on the foundation of theft."
pushed him harder to legitimize his place in American history as one of its
greatest legislators and as a future President.
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On October 4, 1957 the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I into a successful
orbit around the earth. The satellite was an aluminum sphere, twenty-three
inches in diameter and weighing 184 pounds. It also contained instruments
which for 21 days radioed data concerning cosmic rays, meteoroids, and the
density and temperature of the upper atmosphere. But for all the research
data which the satellite was transmitting to earth, probably its most
important radio broadcast was a steady but meaningless series of beeps
which it transmitted over normal radio frequencies to be picked up with
delight by all the Soviet citizens and admirers of the Soviet space program
back on earth-and with consternation by all the U.S. citizens and admirers of
the U.S. space program. Sputnik would crash into the earth's surface some
fifty-seven days after it was launched into orbit, but its effects would be felt
well into the next decade.
The Soviets then launched another Satellite into orbit on November 3 of that
year, this one containing a dog, Laika. Throughout the media the terrible
news read Soviets, 2, and the United States, 0, in the suddenly
all-important new space race. What was wrong? How could the Soviets who
we always thought to be so far behind in technology and scientific
development have surpassed us? The fact that the United States was quickly
able to launch two satellites of its own, Explorer and Vanguard II, into orbit
on the heels of Sputnik II was of little consolation. America had been
publicly beaten by the Soviets and second place was simply not good
enough.
What came to be known as the Soviet/American "space race" was born of
these events at the close of the 1950s and like all races it was built more on
hysteria and mass psychological interest than on any substantial
phenomenon. What gives a race meaning and importance are the

psychological factors upon which the race is built: the fact that an audience
is watching the event, that they know in advance what the participants are
trying to achieve, and that, in the way that the race is constructed, there
can only be one winner.
The manner in which the American space program developed in the Kennedy
years after Sputnik was primarily as a vehicle for American propaganda to
promote American prestige throughout the world, and particularly in the
Third World. Its purpose was to boost U.S. morale and competitive spirit and
to display the superior abilities of the United States. The conscious and
public decision to land a man on the moon as made by JFK in his address to
the nation on May 25, 1961, is testimony to that premise.
Another, unspoken, purpose of the U.S. space program was a military one.
Increasingly, the importance of accurate surveillance of Soviet military
installations became a primary concern for the U.S. military and with the
development of the Cold War this became almost exclusively a job for the
space program and satellites; the policies of the Kennedy administration
following the lead of the Eisenhower administration helped to formalize the
military's leading, if secretive, role in U.S. space policy. Interestingly, the
least important factor behind the development of the U.S. space program
was the one for which it would constantly promote itself, scientific space
exploration. Although scientific research would always be a part of NASA's
mission, it played almost no role in the appropriation of funds and in the
choice of which missions would be carried out and in what manner.
All three purposes for the U.S. space program were actually complimentary.
The purpose of scientific exploration was often used as a cover to launch
military surveillance satellites while the military aspect of the space program
and the overall all strategic importance of space was often given as a
rationale for undecided congressmen wary of the large expenditures of the
space program and not convinced of its value as a propaganda vehicle. But
despite these complimentary aspects of the various purposes of the space
program, it was its value as a propaganda that caught the eye of the
Kennedy administration.
To President Eisenhower amidst the hysteria of the Sputnik launch, there
was no "space race." The United States had been working for some time on
sending rockets into orbit and in his mind our program was functioning well
and on schedule-of what difference was it that the Soviets had managed to
put a satellite into orbit one month in front of the United States? Eisenhower
was against the mentality developing in the United States that we were in a
race with the Soviet Union. He was always sensibly concerned with the
possibility of an hysterical state of competition developing between the

United States and the Soviet Union particularly in the field of armaments.
This hysteria Eisenhower saw as wastefully counterproductive and, with the
memories of the McCarthy "red scare" still fresh in his mind from the
beginning of the decade, potentially very dangerous. Eisenhower worked
actively to calm the American public trying where ever possible to diminish
their fears and to convince them that there was no cause for alarm.
Unfortunately, this was to no avail and the "space race" became a reality.
The news media fueled peoples fears that the United States was falling
behind the Soviets in the critical field of scientific research and consequently
82% of the American public believed that the U.S. was falling behind the
(1)

Soviets in the development of advanced weapons. A new call was put out
to place more focus on the sciences in education. The public also became
concerned that there was a "missile gap" in the Soviet's favor with regard to
nuclear warheads-this, in fact, turned out to be utterly groundless and that,
whatever missile gap there was, it was decidedly in our favor. With the
approach of the election year of 1960, a young Senator from Massachusetts
took up these concerns and made them a centerpiece for his presidential
election campaign and an indictment of eight years of Republican
"complacency." In many ways, the American space program made the ideal
platform from which Kennedy could show case a new American commitment
to excellence and reinvigorate American prestige throughout the world.
In the new global climate, Kennedy's approach and the language of the
"space race" had some merit. Eisenhower's point of view was valid
domestically: we should not let our own self worth and our own endeavors
as a nation be dictated by outside pressures and allow ourselves to be
caught up in a competitive atmosphere that could threaten our very ideals
and tranquillity. But the Cold War was shaping up as a battle for the future
of the Third World, or as Kennedy put it in his speech to the nation on May
th

25 , "the battle for men's minds." Kennedy's larger point that quiet
American resolve could all too easily be interpreted by the people of the
developing world as American complacency and indifference was a more
realistic one internationally. With the Soviets actively courting the nations of
the Third World and trying to impress them with their superior abilities and
skills, the United States could no longer afford the luxury of assuming that
our own talents spoke for themselves. Kennedy was not tied to the space
program in particular out of any overarching principle or great interest in
space exploration. He was only determined to find some means of improving
the prestige of the United States throughout the world. At times, expressing
his own doubts about the validity or world-wide importance of space
exploration, he even queried his aids to find some suitable equivalent to the

space program in its level of grandeur that would also carrying with it some
kind of tangible resolution to an immediate and pressing need-an affordable
(2)

desalinization process was one such equivalent he had in mind. But, aside
from the fact that it lacks the lyrical quality of the words "space race," a
desalination race also does not seem to capture the imagination in the same
way that space exploration does. For a number of reasons which I will
discuss later, Kennedy began to focus increasingly on the fledgling U.S.
space program as a show case for American ingenuity, putting his
confidence in what was at the time an unproven and somewhat demoralized
agency whose origins were far from the lofty ideals Kennedy hoped for it to
represent.
Starting with the first satellite, Sputnik, in 1957, there would be within thirty
years more than 3,000 space launchings and in excess of 14,000 satellites
(3)

put into orbit. A large number of these satellites were military satellites
and, in fact, the U.S. space program, itself, began with the reconnaissance
satellite program in 1954. Ever since the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, the
U.S. military has been obsessed with obtaining accurate military
information. In the Cold War, starting with the U2 flights over Soviet military
installations, the U.S. military had constantly strived to maintain the
advantage over the Russian military in accurate and up-to-date information.
Because of the relative openness of U.S. society compared to that of the
Soviets this edge had to be maintained through superior surveillance
technology as opposed to espionage. Initially the unmatched altitude
capabilities of the U2 aircraft allowed U.S. air reconnaissance to be carried
out over Soviet airspace with relative impunity and it may well be said that
the shooting down of U2 pilot, Gary Powers, in 1960 over Soviet airspace
actually put as much drive into the U.S. space program as did the successful
(4)

Sputnik launch.

At the same time that the U.S. space program was taking shape under
NASA, the United States military decided to follow a path of dependency on
satellite surveillance as their main source of intelligence gathering. This
course created certain needs for the U.S. military which began to show
themselves in how the United States was positioning itself in international
organizations concerning the nascent field of space law. The great time and
effort required to make a successful surveillance satellite launch, not to
mention the expenditures in resources, in no way precluded the possibility of
the Soviets exerting the much less demanding effort required to knock them
out of orbit once they were installed. It is for this reason that the U.S.
pursued a policy of peaceful use of space as opposed to what the Soviets

would later call for, the non-military use of space. The U.S. had no intention
of keeping the military out of space; it was one of its primary motives for
going there in the first place. The U.S. also pushed for the restriction of
sovereign airspace not to include outer space for much the same reasons.
This course of action also forced the U.S. to reduce the visibility of the
military in the U.S. space program-it is for this reason that the organization
(5)

NASA was founded. Finally, to protect their vulnerable surveillance
satellites, the United States worked to create an international ban on
developing space weapons. Beneath much of the rhetoric of trying to
prevent the Cold War from spreading to the heavens, there was, in fact, a
deliberate attempt to allow the United States to do just the opposite by
giving it cover with which it could set up satellites to spy on the Soviets.
Realizing the need not to appear as the aggressor in using space for military
ends, the Congress and the heads of the National Science Advisory
Committee put pressure on Eisenhower to create NASA and to "officially"
remove the space program from the Department of Defense. The
organization set up to coordinate the newly formed NASA with what would
be its biggest client, afterwards, even had its name changed from CivilMilitary Liaison Committee to the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating
Board in 1960 to erase any public link between the military and the space
program.
No matter what public face the U.S. government put on NASA, between 75
(6)

and 90% of all of NASA's work would still come from the military. By and
large, however, this public relations spin put on by NASA was highly
effective and it could well be argued that supplying NASA with an appealing
civilian profile may even have had greater "military" impact on the Russians
than any other similar program run by the Pentagon because it gave U.S.
(7)

policy the appearance of taking the higher moral road. Americans were
able to cloak actions taken in our own national interest in the broad rhetoric
of mankind. The fact that, particularly with regard to space, this was not
true is almost irrelevant because, for better or worse, truth in the Cold War
became largely just a matter of public perception.
A number of analyses concerning media coverage given to the U.S. space
program have lamented its largely uncritical stance and even a brief
sampling of the coverage of the New York Times from this era illustrates this
(8)

point. The space program coverage at the time of the Shepard mission
and the Kennedy pledge to land a man on the moon is overwhelmingly
favorable to the space program. Whatever arguments that are made against

the objectives of the program are represented poorly and buried in the back
pages. Instead the Times focuses the issue of the U.S. space program with
almost unfailing consistency as a comparison with the program of the Soviet
Union. Hardly an article is printed on the U.S. program without mentioning
its counterpart in Russia. The overall point of the importance of the U.S.
space program to the national interest is impossible to miss.
This bias is, of course, not entirely the creation of the New York Times but is
instead more reflective of a general atmosphere throughout the country,
what the Times itself described following the successful mission of Shepard
as "one of ...the highest peaks of exultation since the end of World War
(9)

II." Political leaders promoted and were also swept up in that atmosphere
of exultation. Senator Robert Kerr, in commenting on the Shepard mission,
said it was "the most climatic thing that happened in my lifetime"
(10)

Senator Fulbright called
(presumably even more important than WWII).
the event "the most encouraging accomplishment in technological affairs in
recent years" and it was "extremely successful from the point of view of the
individual and of the country" in overcoming what he described as a
(11)

Even leaders who were critics of the space program
defeatist attitude.
had to preface their remarks with their overall support for the program.
Representative John Blatnik of Minnesota in expressing his misgivings about
the program and its tremendous budget had to concede at first that the
proposal to land a man on the moon was "important, of course," as if there
was no dispute at all as to its essential value to the nation.
The central role of the U.S. space program in the nation's overall foreign
policy and military objectives is evident in the way Kennedy presented it to
the nation on the night of May 25, 1961. He justified the pledge to land a
man on the moon as needed to promote a "freedom doctrine" around the
world. The popularity of the space program was made clear in the
unquestioning way it was accepted as the ultimate goal of the nation. In
commenting on the speech, the New York Times on the following day listed
the major government initiatives proposed as: the space program and the
moon landing, increased foreign economic and military aid, and the
strengthening of the Army and Marine corps. The space program has
catapulted in a short time from obscurity to the nation's number one
priority. Nowhere in the Times for that day is there any questioning of the
connection between promoting a "freedom doctrine" and the program to
land a man on the moon. A connection which on the face of it seems
tenuous at best in the rhetoric of the Cold War becomes axiomatic. The U.S.
space program had become the centerpiece of the nation's foreign policy.

Not surprisingly, NASA has probably turned out to be better at dealing with
the media than any other U.S. government agency, but its creation in 1958
would have far reaching effects beyond its value as a simple public relations
vehicle. NASA's creation represented a consolidation of what can be called
technocracy in America. The increased government coordination of science,
education, industry, and government that it represents has redefined
relationships between the public and the private sector and has made them
(12)

The powers granted to NASA were unprecedented
more interdependent.
in their scope. It is by and large an independent organization made up of
America's scientific and educational elite and backed by America's largest
corporations.
With the arrival of the space race in the Cold War era, a large amount of
America's faith in itself would be placed in its technological capabilities. Most
Americans would come to believe in America's superiority based for the
most part on the superiority of our technology as made possible through this
cooperation between government, education, and industry. In a full page ad
run across the nation following the Shepard Mercury mission, B.F. Goodrich
(the tire and rubber company) exclaimed: "Astronaut probes space in a B.F.
Goodrich suit." This ad, and other ads like it, reinforced in the public's mind
a link between the confidence Americans had in their consumer product
technology, their space program, and their patriotism in general. The subtle
message behind the B.F. Goodrich ad is that the same expertise that keeps
astronauts safe in space keeps you safe on the road and all of this comes
not only from the greatness of B.F. Goodrich but from the American nation
and the American system in general. It would be somewhat ironic that so
many Americans would go on to gauge the value of their own nation based
on technological feats designed initially to impress Third World people. In
this respect one can see made manifest the early concerns of Eisenhower
that an unbridled state of competition with the Soviets might well obscure
(13)

from the American people their very own values.

The largely autonomous technocracy that helped to promote this sort of
American "cult of technology" was what Eisenhower warned about in his
farewell address, referring to it as the dangers of the military-industrial
complex. He cautioned Americans of the influence this powerful new
complex could bring to bear on America's "economic, political, and even
spiritual" character. He concluded that "[w]e must never let the weight of
the combination endanger out liberties or democratic process. We should
take nothing for granted."
This military-industrial complex would eventually come into its own during

the Vietnam war which was coincidentally also the height of the U.S. space
program. The farewell statement of Eisenhower, however, as prophetic and
pithy as it was also has the air of a Frankenstein warning the world of the
creature he had created. These branches of the government that the
Eisenhower administration formed and the corresponding industries in the
private sector as well as the expertise in higher education which the
president and his staff helped coordinate would ultimately be driven by
some sort of self will independent of any intelligible control on the part of
Eisenhower or his successors. While Eisenhower could not escape his
responsibility in the process through his warning farewell remarks he at
least showed his concern for what was at stake. Unfortunately, in a culture
increasingly content to believe in professional "experts" and to take things
for granted, this concern was not shared with sufficient vigor in the public.
Despite all the government and public support behind it, NASA actually got
off to a very rocky start and some were at the time even predicting its quick
demise. The main problem it faced at the beginning of the space program
were its rockets. The Atlas rockets which were meant to provide the thrust
for the Mercury space program were actually designed for the military's
nuclear missile program; this was the same for the Russians as well as
almost all work in rocketry was carried out by the military. The irony of the
situation for the Americans was that because their missile program was so
much more advanced than that of the Soviets, they were able to build much
more weight efficient warheads for their missiles which required much less
thrust than did the equivalent missiles of the Soviet Union. Therefore,
coming into the space race, the Soviets had the advantage of having much
more powerful rockets at their disposal than did the United States.
Consequently, at the start of the Kennedy administration in 1961, because
of the difficulties posed by refitting these missile rockets, the U.S. suffered
two discouraging and very public failures of their Mercury rockets.
The heads of NASA, being well connected to the scientific and education
community, were also aware of the skepticism brewing in those areas
concerning the Mercury program as a worthwhile scientific endeavor, beyond
its technical problems with the Atlas rockets. A study of physicists at
Berkeley conducted at the time showed a large majority convinced that the
U.S. space program was largely being carried out for militaristic and
propagandistic purposes and that as far as good research was concerned the
(14)

The new president elect, John Kennedy,
public was wasting its money.
had at that time just received a memo from his chief scientific advisor, Dr.
Jerome Wiesner of MIT, counseling him to cancel the Mercury program. In
his words, the problem with the Mercury program was that it

"[s]trengthened the popular belief that man in space is the most important
aim of our non-military space effort ...[a] crash program aimed at placing a
man into orbit at the earliest possible time cannot be justified solely on
(15)

It seemed that the scientific and
scientific or technical grounds."
education community were upset about the concerns of other groupsgovernment, industry, and military-unduly influencing their space program.
With two failures on their hands, NASA was worried that the new president
would sour on the idea of a manned space program and they were well
aware that his advisor, Wiesner, was filling him with all sorts of fears of a
potential public disaster and the possibility of a dead astronaut on his hands.
Consequently, they stepped up plans for their next launch. On January 31,
1961, Ham-a highly trained chimpanzee-was blasted off into space and
landed safely in the ocean back on earth. His mission was exactly the same
one that would be carried out by Alan Shepard a few months later.
Everything was set. It was next to impossible, NASA thought, for Kennedy to
cancel the Mercury program on the very threshold of success; as it turned
out, the ensuing run of events would make it completely impossible.
NASA, of course, was completely unfounded in their fears of Kennedy's
dislike of the U.S. manned space program as he would eventually turn out to
be probably the greatest presidential booster of NASA in its history. Unlike
Eisenhower who seemed so sentimental about America's past, Kennedy was
almost impatient for its future. Even though Johnson helped create NASA
and was fundamental in giving it such sweeping powers, it was Kennedy
more than anyone else who came to be identified with the ideals and
premises of the U.S. space program; NASA became Kennedy's tool and the
(16)

astronauts were Kennedy's friends.

On April 12, 1961, the Soviets became the first nation in history to put a
man into orbit. Yuri Gagarin orbited the earth a number of times and
returned safely back to earth to be received with a hero's welcome in the
Soviet Union. He was honored with a tremendous parade through Red
Square and all around the world curious and undecided eyes watched the
Soviets celebrate what was promoted as a stunning achievement of the
potential of their system and their own capabilities. A man had climbed into
the very heavens and peered down on creation, and that man was a Soviet
Communist.
To make matters worse, the U.S., just days after the launch of Gagarin,
suffered the humiliating and tragic defeat of its specially trained Cuban
émigré forces at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. While the Soviets were navigating

the heavens, the United States was bogged down in the Bay of Pigs; the
contrast could not possibly have been more striking. After the debacle,
president Kennedy sent a memo to vice president Johnson, who had been
requested by him to head the Space Council, asking Johnson a number of
question as to the future of the U.S. space program. His first question was:
what chance do we have of beating the Soviets to the moon? He then
inquired about the cost of these proposals and wanted to know if we were
doing everything possible to succeed in this endeavor-were we "working
(17)

twenty-four hours a day?"

Of course, between the successful Soviet orbit launch and the fiasco in
Cuba, the media went into a frenzy and special hearings were set up in
Congress for James Webb, the new Kennedy appointee to head NASA, to
explain to the American people what was going on in the U.S. space
program. Representative Fulton put the situation bluntly before Webb: "tell
us how much money you need and we on this committee will authorize all
you need. I'm tired of being second to the Soviets. I want to be first. I
would work the scientists around the clock and stop some of this ...scientific
(18)

If the American scientists were concerned about being able to
business."
do their "scientific business," the huge appropriations which Congress was to
provide proved adequate comfort.
For 1961, the budget of NASA was increased by 11%. For 1962, it was
increased by 44%. And in every year from 1963 to 1967, NASA would see
its appropriations rise by at least 5 billion dollars; Mr. Fulton was true to his
word. These were just the direct appropriations to NASA and of course do
not include all the funds included in research grants and spread liberally
throughout the scientific academic community or the various subcontracts
made with U.S. industry to provide support for the space program.
th

Alan Shepard became the first American in orbit on May 5 of that year and
with that success Kennedy felt sufficiently confident to go before the
th

Congress on May 25 and in a speech often referred to as his second
inaugural show his public support for the U.S. manned space program and
pledge the United State's commitment to land a man on the moon before
the end of the decade.
Project Apollo represented a fundamental change in the philosophy of
government as promoted from the White House. It was obviously a broad
departure from the fiscal conservativism as practiced by Kennedy's
predecessor, Eisenhower. But it also marked an evolution of Roosevelt's
philosophy of the New Deal that was so profound that it was almost

revolutionary. As opposed to government merely interfering in the private
sector, when dire circumstances required it, as a corrective agent, this new
philosophy promoted, instead, constant and long term action, in good times
or in bad. The new administration came to view project Apollo as part of a
broader challenge to the traditional role of federal government. Proponents
of the Apollo program within the administration were dissatisfied with
existing management of national resources. Viewing the space program as a
"catalyst" for social progress, technological revolutions, and the
restructuring of institutions, Kennedy and his advisors laid out the
blue-prints for an activist federal government that would seek to change
society in a progressive manner and effect a positive influence on its
(19)

citizenry and industry.

The Apollo project, for all its awe-inspiring display of pyrotechnics and skill,
had the advantage of falling into an easily recognizable and understood
narrative. It involved perhaps the biggest non-military appropriation of
funds in U.S. history and created a tremendously large and for the most part
unaccountable federal bureaucracy but it did so under the premise of an
appealing narrative. The romance and intrigue of the moon, coupled with
the story of the frontier, gave Kennedy a way of depicting a march to the
moon that was both exciting and familiar to Americans. It took the form of a
(20)

All this drew
story-a heroic adventure-complete with heroes and villains.
attention away from what would be normally, in other institutions, seen as
dangerously large expenditures and ill-defined systems of public
accountability.
In conclusion, the U.S. space program was far different from what its lofty
public goals and rhetoric made it seem. It origins were in the U.S. military
and the U.S. military would remain its main client. Also, NASA's impact
would have repercussions far beyond its given field of space exploration. By
promoting a more activist federal government and by setting a precedent for
public and private sector cooperation it represents as well a broad based
change in the philosophy of American government in addition to a
fundamental change in how American government is implemented. But
perhaps the most important element of U.S. space program resides in the
very psychological realm of the space race from which it rose to prominence.
In a country whose very culture is engrossed in the principles of advertising
and promotion and particularly in a president who proved in his election
campaign his own adeptness in the manipulation of imagery, the potential
value of the moon in ingraining the image of the United States in the minds
of all the worlds people was undeniable. And the spectacle that such a feat

would provide the media was equally irresistible; it would be in the words of
one American TV journalist-reflecting the words of that great American
showman P.T. Barnum-a great expense, some ten dollars per capita, but it
(21)

A
was fair enough for "what is by far the greatest show on earth."
cosmonaut goes up into space and comes down; afterward there is hardly a
trace of his achievement. But to land on the moon is almost to touch the
eternal and universal. If the United States could land a man on the moon,
afterward, when every child learns the name of the moon in his or her own
language and gazes up at it in wonder, as everyone is bound to do at some
point, they will probably also learn that men from the United States walked
at one time across that very surface. A subliminal billboard promoting the
United States would be placed before the eyes of all the earth's people in
the form of the moon; no advertising agency could ask for better
penetration than that.
Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, NASA and the U.S. space program as
it took shape in the early sixties was built almost entirely around the
premise of national interests. This duplicity, as unfortunate as it is, is in and
of itself not the main problem, however. Equal measures of duplicity and
misleading rhetoric were made by the Soviets to the people of the Third
World as were done by the United States and, although it could be argued
that two wrongs do not make a right, it would have been foolhardy to allow
the Soviets to seduce the world with the inflated and deceptive merits of
their system based on the hopeful belief that people will be able to recognize
truth over bombast. The United States had to promote itself and its prestige
throughout the world and NASA was an instrumental tool in that endeavor.
The real problem is the unbridled and naive enthusiasm into which the
American public was allowed to drift while under the distorting influence of
American Cold War rhetoric. In presenting an idealized omnipotent image of
ourselves to the Third World we ultimately fell victim to the danger of
actually confusing that exported image to the world with our own
understanding of ourselves. The grand rhetoric of president Kennedy and
the U.S. space program was undoubtedly inspirational but its value was
largely in the image of commitment, dedication, and achievement which the
administration wanted to express to the other nations of the world in the
face of what Vice President Johnson described as Communist doubts about
(22)

the "resolution of the free world and especially ...the United States."
Great nations must maintain great appearances. Kennedy understood that in
a way that Eisenhower did not and he succeeded in presenting a compelling
image for the United States to uphold to the world in the great struggle that
was the Cold War.

The media's enthusiastic coverage of the Mercury and Apollo programs
probably went a long way in helping Americans loose their sense of
perspective. Once the frenzy reached a critical mass, of course, any word of
restraint would be looked upon as being reflective of poor patriotic spirit and
eventually things would become so distorted that the lunar landing would
commonly be seen by many Americans as one of the greatest achievements
of the American people. The problem in this, of course, is that this was
supposed to be how the people of other nations should see it as it was done
with them primarily in mind and had no intrinsic value for the nation itself. It
is impossible for political leaders to proscribe one set of rhetoric for
international consumption and another for domestic consumption and
unfortunately for many Americans this divergence of appearances from
reality that became a byproduct of the Cold War was too much for them to
work out. Eisenhower was right in pointing out the dangers of the militaryindustrial complex. The consolidation of power under the rubric of
technocracy within that complex is of grave concern. But, perhaps, the real
tragedy that came of these events was not so much in the balance of power
as it was in the distortion of ideals and the subsequent distortion of the
American character and identity.
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The Student Movement in Mexico in 1968 was the first major step to ending overt corruption and bringing
about changes promised by the Revolution of 1910. Although few changes in the political system took
place at the time, students helped to open the eyes of the Mexican people and encouraged them to
demand the rights usurped by the bourgeoisie, as had their revolutionary fathers at the turn of the
century. In Latin America, university students had a lot of leverage, originating in the fact that most
students came from upper class families. As Richard Renner wrote in 1965, university students and
(1)

faculty were typically the groups which pointed out the problems within the nation.
In particular, the
Mexican Student Movement was able to rally much support from their schools and communities by
informing them of the corruption within the Mexican government.
Throughout the 1960s, Mexico experienced great economic stability and growth. The government used
recent economic success to distract attention from existing problems. Although Mexico was growing
richer, there had been virtually no change in the inequalities between classes. There were many who were
impoverished, and few saw more than minor improvements in their standard of living. In contrast to those
of European descent or foreign-born people, mestizos and Indians remained in poverty; many lived in the
slums or poor villages. Repression of the lower classes had increased since World War II, and most of the
income growth fell into the pockets of the elite. The lower classes share of the national income fell. The
middle class, from which many students came, saw some economic benefits, but they lacked political
representation. The way they felt was reflected by Octavio Paz: "without democracy, economic
(2)

development has no meaning."

The Mexican government had sold out to foreign interests, becoming,
(3)

Even though the Mexican government had
according to Manuel Aguilar, a "direct agent of big business."
always served the bourgeoisie, the government now openly showed such bias. Such actions contrasted
with the ideals for which the Partido Revolutionario Institucional (PRI) government was supposed to
stand: those of the Revolution of 1910, to be a revolutionary government that worked in the interests of
all people.
The Mexican students only had to look across the ocean to see how other students dealt with such
matters. Revolts were taking place in Paris, Tokyo, and many other major cities. In Eastern Europe,
students called for action towards nationalism and democracy. In the West, students strove to reverse the
ills of consumer society. Students modeled their ideas on how to organize and inspire people to action on
the examples of students from other nations. Unlike most other student revolutions, Mexican students
focused little on university problems, and looked at the grander picture, calling for democracy for the
entire nation. Mexican students at first avoided the type of violent or radical protest that was used in the
(4)

Still,
United States and France in the same period, trying to maintain a more conservative program.
repression of the Student Movement in Mexico took a similar turn to that of the other nations. The
bourgeoisie had the power and the interest to protect their elevated status, and used their means to
maintain it. Police and army forces became a major part of the repression, and blamed foreigners and

leftist ideas for the uprising.
The trouble between the students and government began with a fight between a preparatory school
student and a technical student in Mexico City, a fight that turned a riot, ending with granaderos (riot
police) beating students. The events of the night so angered the students that days later, the Instituto
Politechnico Nacional or the Polytechnic Institute (IPN) formed a protest against the granaderos' excessive
use of force. This protest met with another demonstration organized by Universidad Nacional Autonima de
Mexico (UNAM) students, members of the largest university in Mexico, and the union of the two most
powerful schools was begun. From that point on, the movement was guided by the Consejo Nacional de
Huelga (CNH-the Strike Committee), the body of student leadership made up of students from both
schools, that would plan a series of demonstrations and rallies that took place during the months to come.
The movement came to a screeching halt with a bloody massacre in the center of Mexico City on October
2, 1968. This essay discusses this struggle and the forces which helped to make it so powerful.
Although the left was only indirectly involved with the movement, leftist ideals helped to shape the
demands which initially lead to this revolt. Before the students took action, the left was largely
responsible for inspiring changes in the social welfare system of the government. The left has been alive
in Mexico for many years, starting with the most important group, the Mexican Communist Party (Partido
Communista de Mexico, or PCM), which began in 1918. The PCM organization was not the only place that
leftists could be found. In fact, the PRI, the main ruling party of Mexico, at one time almost joined the
(5)

Socialist International group.
The left also existed in other political parties and within the universities in
groups which stood for the ideals of leftist thinkers such as Mao, Trotsky, and Castro.
In the late 1940s, communist parties became illegal in many Latin American nations, including Mexico.
The Mexican government continued to harass communist groups up until and including the time of the
Student Revolution. Meetings had to be held secretly, so it was hard for a Communist party to recruit
members. Membership dropped. The left had little real power by the 1960s, but it continued to serve as
(6)

inspiration for students to take a stand against the government.
The intellectual left, what remained of
them, was the bridge between leftist ideas and the university student body, voicing the need for
anti-imperialism, equality, and social justice. It was the demands of the left, born under the poverty and
injustice of the PRI's political monopoly that would be transformed into the reasons for the students'
protest.
Aside from the inspiration of leftism within the nation, students were also influenced by the events that
had taken place in Cuba just nine years before. The Cuban Revolution showed other Latin American
nations that there existed the possibility of a successful revolution in a Latin American nation that does
not have a well-developed capitalist system. People who had before believed that any attempt at revolt in
Mexico would be unfruitful, saw that the revolution in Cuba served to educate the people, eradicate
poverty, and fend off American imperialism. In Mexico, Communist resurgence took place at the
(7)

university level after the Cuban Revolution, and students raised awareness of government corruption.

Although some students leaders were Communist, the ideology in no way dominated the overall purpose
of the protest. Jorge Castaneda states that the student movement "shook the 'perfect dictatorship'."
Although the autonomous university had long been the center for criticism, the 1968 generation of
students was the first to step into politics in mass numbers in order to oppose the PRI government.

(8)

(9)

Even though PRI-supported groups existed in the university, they were swept aside by the mass anti-PRI
th

sentiment. On July 26 , the first student demonstration was actually staged by a government-supported
group of tech students (the FNET), who held the protest in hopes of limiting opposition against the PRI.
Instead, the itinerary changed in the middle of the demonstration, and anti-government sentiment won
out. From that day on, the FNET was discredited. Later, the CNH (the Strike Committee) was formed to
take over leadership of the movement. The CNH represented what the students wanted unlike the FNET,
which played as a puppet for the PRI government. The CNH tried to avoid affiliation with any one group,
such as the Socialists or the Communists.
The demands of the CNH included: release of political prisoners, dissolving of the granadero force,
indemnification for the families of students who were killed by the excessive force of granaderos, firing

the police chief of Mexico City, and repeal of the penal codes that restricted free speech and press. The
real motivation for the revolt went much deeper than the release of political prisoners and removal of
government officials. The basis of all protest was social inequality and political repression, and protestors
sought to fulfill the promises of the Revolution of 1910. Only certain people in 1968 received benefit by
the actions of the government, so the protest tried to reveal PRI corruption. Students wanted to shift the
focus of state policies from the elite to the poor, the laborers, and lower and middle classes, who had
been shunned by the system. The students wanted the government to stop thinking about American
business opportunities and, instead, focus on programs for social service. They fought to bury the
(10)

repression and corruption that had been Mexican government traditions.

The government of 1968, on the other hand, focused only on a few key elements of Mexican affairs. Any
threats to the success of the Olympic Games (to be held in Mexico City that year and a major source of
(11)

The students
pride for the nation), the PRI monopoly, or the economy called for serious repression.
represented a threat to all three and thus faced extreme repression. A preparatory school student
(12)

The PRI saw to it that people
commented that "the PRI doesn't go in for dialogues, just monologues."
who did not want to comply with the way the PRI worked ended up jobless or worse.
Students openly criticized the presidency, which was essentially a six-year dictatorship. The movement
encouraged all people to participate, to demand from the government that which they had been denied.
Criticism of the President, previously unheard of, was a part of the students' effort to reveal the
government for it what it really was. The more the government repressed the students, the more the
government proved that the students were right. As people outside of the university saw outright displays
of repression, they became convinced that changes had to be made in their country. Any media that
criticized the government was censored. Any public protest was also prohibited, as could be seen by the
response of the granaderos to the student protests. Even party members were forced to resign their
(13)

offices if they questioned the way in which the PRI operated.

The students found it difficult to demonstrate their dislike for the government because the granaderos
interfered, no matter how peaceful the demonstrations were. The UNAM Faculty of Philosophy and Letters
Strike Committee best described the granaderos as an unconstitutional force that uses excessive brutality
and disproportionate force, a microcosm for the functions of the Mexican government. The students
demanded relatively little of the government-just fulfilling some of the six demands, which the CNH drew
up, would have reassured a good amount of the student population. Instead of trying to work out a
solution that both the students and the government could agree on, however, the government decided to
crush the student rebellion with the greatest force possible. Students admitted that they anticipated being
jailed and even beaten by the granaderos for participating in the movement, but it was murder that they
did not expect. The granaderos were ruthless, beating anyone who appeared to be a student, smashing
their cars and stealing their belongings. Most people at the demonstration were peaceful; the havoc that
came to be associated with the movement was a result of granadero action. One student noted that "a
demonstration without the police is a peaceful demonstration."
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Diaz Ordaz, President of Mexico at the time of the Student Movement, attempted to tarnish the
movement's image. Ordaz made it seem as though he wanted to help the students, but that they were
out of control and unreasonable. In his annual address to the nation he stated that the government had
(15)

"been criticized for …excessive leniency."
He also stated in the same address that he would use all
means possible to halt the student uprisings. The address made it appear that the students were irrational
and that the harsh government actions were justified. Perhaps Ordaz did not realize that if he had tried to
th

negotiate early on, he could have saved many lives. On August 13 , less than a month into the
movement, the students had gone to the National Palace to call upon Ordaz, ordering that he come out
and face the students. Taking the advice of his counselors, the president did not appear. This was a huge
mistake. If he had appeared, those unsure of the validity of the movement may have been impressed by
(16)

the gesture, and been persuaded to trust the government once again.

It was not until July 22 that the government issued a statement that they would meet with the student
leaders in private. Previously, the students had stated that any dialogue must be a public affair, and thus
refused to take up the offer of the government. The government demanded that the students be patient

and comply with their way of doing things, or no demands would be met. The students did not trust the
government because they had seen how the government had dealt with other movements. For example,
the Physicians' Movement in 1965 had bowed before the government in hopes of receiving compliance
with their demands, but in the end, many of the physicians were thrown in jail and none of their demands
were met. The students did not believe the government's promises. Nonetheless, their refusal made the
students seem disrespectful and radical.
The students had other battles to wage besides just those with the government. Parents of the students
did not understand their children's generation, or why they were protesting. Just the fact that the women
wore short skirts and the men grew their hair long was evidence for some parents that the students were
radicals. Some people believed that the movement only served to make trouble, not understanding that
the students tried to keep the peace and wanted to create a better life for all the people of Mexico.
Inversely, the students were ashamed of their parents' generation, believing that they would rather be
(17)

submissive to the government than to fight for what was important.

The students gained support by talking one-on-one with people in stores, factories, and neighborhoods.
On the buses and street corners, other students asked for donations. Each day the students passed out
half a million handbills describing their cause and asking for support, and collected pesos, which were
pored back in the funding for advertisement. Students hijacked buses to use as an important tool for
propaganda, serving as a stage for speakers, or painted with pro-movement slogans. They had "lightning
meetings," which were dialogues held from the roofs of stores and buses that broke up as soon as a
policeman was sighted. Other means of advertising included painting walls of the city with slogans, even
painting on the National Palace.
Workers had some problems understanding what the student movement represented. They saw the
students as troublemakers. The pirating of buses often caused inconveniences for workers trying to get to
their jobs. People wondered why the middle class students were fighting against the PRI system when it
was the universities that usually furnished the government with its bureaucrats. Some believed that the
students should have started the protest against the university itself, since corrupt government officials
were trained there. Even workers who supported the movement rarely participated in the demonstrations,
because the workers were heavily controlled by PRI-run unions, and did not want to risk losing what little
stability they had. Support for the students sometimes came from small independent unions, but rarely
from larger unions because they were PRI-run and did not want changes. Despite negative reactions from
workers, the students managed to make some breakthroughs. The movement slowly created some
(18)

Workers eventually came to
understanding and respect between the workers and the students.
appreciate the fact that the students were fighting on their behalf also. Even though few workers joined in
the marches and demonstrations, a number attended as spectators to show their support.
Students tried their best to rally support in a pacific manner; the best example of this was the Silent
March, which took place on September 13. The demonstration was held in silence to prove to the
government and the public that the students had discipline and self-control, and that the movement was
not just a conglomeration of spontaneous riots. The Silent March was seen as a "sincere" and "touching"
demonstration, and encouraged many to support of the movement. The power of the silence helped the
movement to gain strength, to capture the confidence of the people. One handbill issued at the
demonstration explains the purpose of the day: "You can see that we are not vandals or rebels without a
(19)

cause-the label that is constantly pinned on us. Our silence proves it."

The Silent March also served to prove that the students had no interest in disturbing the Olympic Games,
as the government led the public to believe. The notice that was posted to announce the rally stated
specifically that there was no intent whatsoever to interfere with the Olympic festivities. It is true that the
students were not pleased with the Olympics. The money that was used to make the city ready for the
Games would have been better spent on social programming to limit the poverty of the nation. People
were starving in Mexico, yet the government had millions to spend on new buildings and sports
complexes, in order to showcase Mexico to the world. As Evelyn Stevens notes, the "incumbent elite was
spending too much for circuses and not enough for bread."

(20)

us," became a slogan of the student revolution for this reason.

"Hunger and Misery are the agitators, not
(21)

As the movement progressed, the government became frustrated with trying to end the students'
protests, so within a week in September, the army of Mexico occupied both the IPN and UNAM. The UNAM
occupation was more shocking, since the university, unlike the IPN, was autonomous from the
government. Although the army occupation of the two campuses made it difficult for the leaders of the
movement to organize mass demonstrations, the occupation helped to build support from more members
(22)

of the community, including taxi drivers, shop owners, clerks, and peddlers.
The government saw that
the occupation had not quelled the movement at all, and decided to take severe measures of force against
the students.
The climax of the revolution came on October 2, just one day after the army left the university. It was
only 10 days until the Olympics were to be held in Mexico City, so the government was worried that
student protests would interfere with the success of the Games. For this reason, many army and police
troops were on guard for the last major protest of 1968. Witnesses all tell the same story of a peaceful
movement turned into a massacre. The demonstration that day was going to consist of a march to the
Polytechnic Institute to demand that the army leave. The march was called off because of the
(23)

concentration of army troops on the route to the school.

Instead, the 10,000 or so attendants of the
(24)

protest listened to "tame" speeches in the Plaza of Three Cultures, right in the heart of Mexico City.

Many claimed that flares dropped from a helicopter above the Plaza signaled the army to start firing upon
the crowd. The army blocked off the Plaza exits with tanks. Plainclothes policemen, who wore a white
glove on one hand to indicate who they were, appeared from all sides and started to shoot. The speakers
called for everyone to stay calm and not to move. But people panicked and started to run for any shelter
they could find. The heavy fire only lasted ten minutes, but sporadic shooting continued for more than an
hour.
After the shooting ended, there was blood was everywhere-on the walls, on the ground; few people left
the Plaza without the blood of others on their clothing. Ambulances were only able to enter the Plaza
around 11:00 p.m., after the government vehicles had removed most of the dead and injured. The
granaderos began to make arrests; two thousand or more people were jailed that night, on counts of
murder, destruction of government property and kidnaping. Many people were arrested who had nothing
to do with the movement, such as those who lived in the housing nearby and happened to be watching
the events. Some people were held two years without so much as a hearing, jailed for being victims of
(25)

circumstance.

Family and friends had no way of finding out what had happened to those who were jailed or killed. They
were refused information at jails and hospitals as to who had been admitted. Sometimes it was weeks
before a mother found out if their child had lived through the massacre. The government claimed that
only forty-three people were killed. Many Mexicans, especially those who had lived through the massacre,
believed that many hundreds, probably more than one thousand, were killed that day. The government
refused to allow any investigation into the matter. It was as though "causality counts were treated as
(26)

state secrets."

It is believed that the bodies of the dead were taken outside the city and buried or
(27)

burned. Some witnesses at a prison claim that they saw huge bonfires and smelled burning flesh.
nd

Many people disappeared on the 2 , and it can only be assumed that they were killed.
Since the majority of leaders of the movement were jailed or killed before or on October 2, the movement
came to all but a standstill. The CNH members who were not jailed started to argue about which direction
to take the movement-to increase demands or stop protesting before things got worse. The protests that
continued after the massacre mostly concerned the release of political prisoners, with little attention given
to the political demands. The CNH held demonstrations outside the prisons, calling for the release of the
political prisoners. The demonstrations helped to restore some hope to the prisoners, who could hear the
chant of the students from their cells, that they would be freed. There was support from others besides
students also, including some well-known figures. Octavio Paz, a famous writer, resigned his post as an
ambassador, and Barrios Sierra quit his job as the rector of UNAM to protest the madness of the
government. Foreigners, including reporters, who had come early to the Olympics, stated their disgust.
International publications revealed the truth about the lack of democracy and the presence of corruption
in Mexico. Despite the support that the students received, the CNH called off the strike on November 25,

one month after the Olympics.
Just because the CNH stopped protesting did not mean that students forgot about what the government
did. Radical students who were tired of appealing to the government in a civilized manner started an
armed rebellion against the government. Out of the student movement grew a passionate and irrational
guerilla warfare movement. The fight, which once had the purpose of reforming the state, was now set on
(28)

destroying it.
A committed minority of students entered this phase which lasted only untill, robbing
banks and kidnaping. Most people made less radical statements through electoral absenteeism and
creation of anti-government literature.
The government took a very casual approach to the aftermath of the movement. The government's weak
attempt to justify the events of October 2, was to have the newspaper print a phony story that student
sharpshooters had started the incident and had provoked the police. The government cared only that they
succeeded in quieting down the students before Mexico hosted the Olympic Games. For the government's
part, the Olympics were viewed as a success, because no disruptions occurred. But still, the government
nd

faced a problem. The October 2 incident had provoked a lot of sympathy for the students, and anger
towards the government. The movement in general had "ripped away the benevolent mask of
authoritarianism and drew attention to the foundation of poverty upon which the economic miracle was
(29)

built."
It was obvious to all that government reform was the only way to stop the conflict between the
people and the state.
After Diaz Ordaz left the office of President and Luis Echeverria stepped in, steps were made to legitimize
the government in the eyes of the people and reduce the likelihood of insurgency. Those who the public
held responsible for the massacre of the students were Ordaz, the Chief of Police, the Secretary of
Defense, and the mayor. Echeverria tried to win support of the people by firing the Police Chief and the
Mayor of Mexico City. He also made steps towards the demands of the people, making mass participation
in government easier by allowing new political parties to be recognized. Government criticism also
became more acceptable under Echeverria. The President increased spending on welfare, housing, and
education, and expanded the social security program. Another action that regained public support was the
release of all the prisoners jailed in 1968 protests by the end of 1971. The former prisoners were also
(30)

offered state and federal government jobs.

Changes made to the Mexican political system during Echeverria's term were just the start of the
breakdown of corruption. Yet in spite of progressive changes, there is still a lot of crookedness
deep-rooted in the political system, for the habit of Mexican politics to be unfair and underhanded is hard
to break. Still, the Student Movement of 1968 is significant to Mexico today because it was the event
which caused a major push towards ending corruption and giving the people of Mexico a voice. The
message which was conveyed to the government was that people were not afraid to stand up to the
unjust ways of the government. In the legacy of 1968, student protests persist to the present, objecting
to many of the same aspects of the government that the students opposed in 1968.
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The distinctions that separate high and low culture can at times seem
indiscernible. But it is valuable to compare those pastimes considered
popular with those in which only the elite took part. John Brewer and Marc
Baer consider the integration of high and low culture, particularly in the
theatrical arena. Brewer follows the changing attitudes toward "the fine arts"
throughout the eighteenth century and the changes that took place within
the performance, painting, and literary worlds. Baer, on the other hand,
closely studies theatre riots from mid-September through December 17,
1809, which reflect the struggle which occurred when the elite classes began
to attend the theatre in greater numbers. The eighteenth century was a time
of great cultural change as the court's patronage for the fine arts diminished
and a commercial culture emerged within England. Brewer and Baer trace
these changes from a courtly to a commercial culture. They also examine
the dichotomy remaining in this consumer culture between base popular
entertainment and enriching high-minded discussion of ideals.
Brewer states that he intends to "build a bridge between the general reader

and academic scholarship, to write an accessible account of the fine arts and
literature in eighteenth-century England that would draw on scholarly
research" (ix). This he has accomplished, and has created an entertaining
and educational work. The illustrations are especially helpful in clarifying
issues and giving the reader a visual memory of contemporary artists and
critics. Yet the book gives the reader only a general understanding of the
main issues within the cultural history of England during the eighteenth
century.
Brewer divides his work into seven parts, including an introduction of the
cultural contexts and a conclusion offering some inclusion of the whole of
the British Isles. The main focus lies in parts two through four, in which
Brewer individually discusses changes in performance, print, and painting
primarily in London. In parts five through seven he places these individual
changes in national political and social context, providing a definition of an
English cultural heritage, and describing provincial culture and travel
through Britain. Each of these parts generally focuses on a close study of
one or two influential persons within each field. Brewer also makes use of
contemporary newspapers, pamphlets, and letters as evidence for the
changing attitudes of the general public toward eighteenth-century culture.
Brewer opens by explaining the state of the arts within the English Court. He
points out that the early Hanoverian kings were not avid patrons of the arts.
George II, for example, despised reading. He states that the monarch
became less of a public figure, and he describes George III as "the first
'middle-class' monarch" (21). George III and his wife were moralistic and
dull, hampering the liveliness and entertainment that had existed in
previous eras. Brewer asserts that this forced artists to look for more
commercial employment, and that they often times found private patronage
more lucrative than a monarchical commission.
Because artists wanted to reach a large number of people and therefore
make more money, an urban setting was the most economically practical
environment for cultural development. London soon became not only the
business center of England but the cultural center as well. Brewer
concentrates on the artistic expression that was present within London's
society, but he does acknowledge the existence of provincial artists and
writers. In particular he singles out the lives of Thomas Bewick, John Marsh,
and Anne Seward, all of whom avoided London and preferred the provinces.
Central to London's cultural development was the rise of the urban
coffeehouse; it became a place to discuss cultural and critical ideas. Other
important developments included the pleasure garden, concert hall, and
exhibition room. In these places, and within social clubs, culture was defined

and critiqued. Brewer defines the fine arts as "a field of human endeavor
which was neither utilitarian nor rational but pleasing because it affected
people's feelings" (87), and suggests that throughout the century the debate
over the effect and value of the fine arts to the public continued.
The extension of literacy into a more working class culture is another focus
of Brewer's work. He attempts to quantify the number of literate persons
within England. Brewer estimates that sixty percent of the male population
and forty percent of the female population could read by 1750 (167). Yet he
claims that the change in printed matter had less to do with a growing
literate public and more to do with changing restrictions on publishing,
which allowed a wider range of topics and growth in writing. With more
material available to read, the reading styles of the people changed from
"intensive" to "extensive" (169). Brewer explains that "intensive" reading
occurs in places where printed matter is rare; books are cherished,
scrutinized, and re-read many times. "Extensive" reading is only available to
cultures that have a wide variety of printed matter and where the book itself
becomes less honored and remains an entertainment piece.
As more books became available, selling practices changed. Many
booksellers began to allow the borrowing of books for short time at a small
price (176). This practice developed into large circulating libraries. An
intriguing chart of the borrowings from the Bristol Library (181) shows the
number of books borrowed by subject. (History, of course, was almost twice
as popular as any other subject listed.) Other changes in the buying of
printed material included the development of book clubs, a small town
phenomenon, in which people contributed a fixed amount to the club and
thus were able, together, to buy more books than the individual would have
access to alone. Brewer also comments on the illiterate masses noting that
"even those who could not read lived to an unprecedented degree in a
culture of print, for the impact of the publishing revolution extended beyond
the literate" (187). Reading aloud was a popular pastime. Within the
household women read to each other to pass the time and reading out loud
occurred in factories as well. Even those who were illiterate were
encouraged to buy books for literate guests.
With increased publishing, attitudes towards writers changed as well.
Writers were condemned if they wrote simply for profit, yet the professional
writer emerged. The distinction of the hack from the author of an original
idea allowed the emergence of the professional writer. The theory that an
original idea was the property of the creator and that the sale of this
property should profit the laborer gave a special place to those writing
novels and critiques. Only the hack was condemned for his use of others'

ideas to make a profit. This distinction between the author and the hack
illustrates the emerging contrast between virtuous culture and low
entertainment.
The differentiation between high and low culture is especially visible within
the performing arts, yet the line between base and moral entertainment is
much harder to draw. Actors were seen as immoral; to illustrate this point
Brewer quotes the Players' Scourge which stated actors "are the filth and
garbage of the earth, the scum and stain of human nature, the excrements
and refuse of all mankind" (334). Players were thought to be immoral
because they allowed the audience to sympathize with improper characters,
and because in their personal lives many were violent, sexual, and bawdy.
The theaters were located in close proximity to whorehouses and taverns,
which brought more criticism. There were actors, however, who fought to
include performance arts within the realm of highbrow culture. Brewer uses
the example of Sarah Siddons who refused to portray immoral characters
and personally censored lines she felt beneath her character (346). She was
seen as matron, mother, patriot, and exemplified English propriety in spite
of her acting career.
Actors like Siddons and David Garrick gave theater a more respectable place
within English culture. Garrick was a well-known actor who eventually
managed to link his name with that of the respected and revered
actor/playwright, William Shakespeare. Garrick strengthened this link with
the Bard by revising many of Shakespeare's works (409). Garrick's link to
the Bard not only helped his personal career but also established the theater
as a part of a national cultural heritage, raising its reputation in the eyes of
those who had dismissed it as coarse and unrefined entertainment.
The new import of Italian opera also helped to blur the image of the
immoral, improper performer. Women of high social standing held private
concerts (400). These concerts were separated from theatrical performance
but did change the attitude of the aristocracy toward all performers. The
effect that the Italian aria had on English theater is discernible in the
popularity of The Beggar's Opera by John Gay. This piece used a mixture of
high and low culture to reach the audience. The mixing of the aria and the
traditional ballad reflected the range of social classes in the audience
attending the show.
In The Beggar's Opera, Gay satirized plots of other contemporary plays and
figures. For example, the main character is condemned to die and in the last
scene a twist of fate allows the happy ending which was a necessity for
operas of the time. The characters of the opera were based on
contemporary political and criminal figures. Because this opera was a hybrid

of many theatrical genres and highly topical it was popular among many
audiences. Brewer claims The Beggar's Opera "made this new
heterogeneous world of high, low, and commercial art coherent" (429).
Baer also looks at the changes in the theatre and the theatre going public,
but he focuses on a particular event, which illustrates the struggle between
popular and elite culture then taking place. By the early nineteenth century
the theatre had become an arena for the expression of political and social
ideals for most classes. The theatre riots of 1809 exemplify the participation
of English audiences in theatre and their dissatisfaction at being kept out of
decisions affecting their cultural participation.
Because these riots lasted for so long Baer is able to look at the ways the
riots changed, why rioters returned, and why ticket prices brought such an
uproar from the London audiences. Baer also looks at the importance of
theatre to both high and low culture, especially the important role that the
theatre played for the working classes. He tries to prove that disorder can
have a stabilizing effect on society and that these riots in London actually
helped to preserve order. Finally he looks at the way the audience changed
during and after these riots; he sees a direct correlation in the riots and the
changing atmosphere of the audience, which went from a participatory
group to detached and silent just after the theatre riots.
In London only two licensed theatres existed, Drury Lane and Covent
Garden, both of which had to be rebuilt between 1809 and 1811 due to fire.
During the autumn of 1809 Drury Lane was being rebuilt and Covent Garden
was the only theatre that could legally present dramatic performance.
During its reconstruction Covent Garden had undergone some major
changes in seating; in the type of seating offered, the number of available
seats, and the price of those seats. Not only had the manager, Kemble,
raised the prices without considering the opinions of the public, but also
Covent Garden at this time held a monopoly. Audiences thought these new
prices were unfair. Many people felt it was the right of every Englishman to
go to the theatre, these new prices might keep people from ever attending a
show.
Many people believed these new higher prices were unfair and immoral. The
idea of a moral economy was still popular in England at this time. Rioters
thought that the prices for tickets at Covent Garden should reflect a just
price and that the rise in the theatre's costs should not be covered by the
general theatre going public. Some felt the managers should have asked the
people if they could raise the prices; some felt they should somehow cut
costs. But to offer private boxes and higher prices was not the moral way to
increase profits. Thus the riots began and continued for several weeks and

the letters OP, which stood for "Old Prices," became the symbol of the
rioters and their complaints.
While Baer does allow that the moral economy did influence the OPs he
states that "the seemingly obtuse argument of access to legitimate theatre
as a constitutional right appears to have been the most important element
for the OPs in legitimizing their behavior" (84). He shows that those opposed
to the OPs saw them as disrupters of the peace, but the OPs "saw
themselves as the preservers of British freedom" (80). Because the theatre
had become connected to both the popular culture and politics it was a place
that allowed for expression of different opinions. Baer says that most
European governments "feared the stage as much or more than the
press"(81), because the theatre made available new ideas to a wide
audience.
To those people who did not often comment on political or social changes, "a
place in the audience was also a voice" (177). It was a place to express and
receive new ideas and it gave the working classes something to comment
on. Baer compares the cultural importance of the theatre in the early
nineteenth century to the importance placed on sports in the late twentieth
century. These entertainments gave those working class people something
to discuss and understand, something to cherish and cheer, yet it was much
more a part of the English culture than simply this. The theatre was seen as
a part of the English national culture an important part of the English
heritage, and it was a place for the audiences to learn how to be English.
Baer says the theatre's "social importance lay in the fact that it was one of
the few urban arenas--perhaps the only one--where a variety of social
orders heard and saw national virtues demonstrated"(193). The theatre and
the right to attend shows was of great importance to the English people and
these riots reflect the desire of the public to keep the old system intact.
In fact, Baer does argue that the theatre riots show the population's anxiety
to social change and desire to contain the changes taking place. This is why
he feels that these riots had a stabilizing effect on the population. The
rioters showed their desire to return to the old ways, to retain stability by
retaining old traditions. The anxiety of the English about social change is
evident from these riots. The fact that these riots were relatively peaceful
also shows that the OPs did not want to begin a revolution. The riots reflect
the conservative ideals of prudence and moderation and the desire to return
to the old customs, not a desire to tear down and replace old practices.
The government response to the riots also shows that the rioters were
self-controlled. The theatre managers brought in bouncers to protect the
theatre and to quiet the crowd, but the government did not use much force

during the riots. It was understood that the audience had the right to show
approval or disapproval of the shows. Therefore it was difficult to make a
legal distinction between rioting and participation in the evenings events.
During the riots the audience actually became the actors and seemed to
understand that they themselves were putting on the show.
Baer discusses the change that began to take place during and after the
riots of audience participation in plays. For many years the participation of
the audience in staged shows had been declining. The audience began to
take a more passive role in the theatre. Baer argues that the rioters wanted
to "destroy the dramatic performances to re-create a balance between stage
and audience" (185). In the short run the rioters did balance the focus
between stage and audience, but in the long run the stage became the focus
of the audience and audience participation in plays declined even further.
Baer shows that an understanding of the theatre riots of 1809 help to give
the historian a greater understanding of the changing attitudes of the
English public. It gives an example of a disturbance that was meant not to
bring about change but to revive the traditions of the past. The theatre riots
show a collective desire of the English to hold onto the past and at the same
time the right express their beliefs about an established system. The theatre
riots also show the uniqueness of the English public during an era of
revolutions: public who cherished and revels in their own past, who are
cautious to accept great change, and who exercise their right to express
themselves in all aspects of life.
As theatre became an acceptable entertainment for the higher classes, those
laborers who had always attended performances became less welcome in
the audience. Both Baer and Brewer show cultural changes taking place in
Hanovarian England and the struggle that occurs because of these changes.

